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FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 16 SUMMER 1988 NUMBER 2
DETENTION WITHOUT TRIAL IN THE SECOND WORLD
WAR: COMPARING THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN
EXPERIENCES
A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON*
National security has long been advanced as a justification for the
abrogation of civil liberties. In this lecture, Professor Simpson
examines through the analysis of particular cases how two nations
dealt with these competing values in the internment without trial of
their respective citizens during World War I. Condemning the
secrecy and lack of accountability of the authorities responsible for
protecting the nation, Simpson issues a call for vigilance and a
warning that patterns and habits of respect for liberty will serve
better than mere forms of procedure to effectively insure that
liberties are not again abandoned to ill-founded claims of defense
necessity.
My interest in the detention of citizens, without trial, in Britain dur-
ing the war of 1939-1945 arose as a byproduct of a more general inter-
est. The study of cases has long been central to the common law
tradition. But the legal dramas we examine so minutely are too often
both contextless and dehumanized. Real people assume the masks of
the law, becoming plaintiffs and defendants, offerors and offerees,
grantors and contingent remainderpersons, concealed from us by the
forms into which their problems have been packaged for legal analy-
sis. Two English leading cases, decided by the House of Lords on No-
vember 3, 1941, strikingly illustrate this point. Their names are
* D:C.L. (Oxon), Charles F. and Edith J. Clyne Professor of Law, University of Michi-
gan; Professor Emeritus, University of Kent at Canterbury. This Article derives from the Mason
Ladd Memorial Lecture given at the Florida State University College of Law in April 1988. It
represents a development of work delivered in 1987 as Rhetoric, Reality and Regulation 18B, the
Child and Co. Oxford Lecture. I am in the process of writing a comprehensive treatment of
Britain's World War II detention practices.
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Liversidge v. AndersonI and Greene v. Secretary of State for Home
Affairs.2 In both cases individuals, Robert William Liversidge, alias
Jack Perlsweig, and Ben Greene respectively, attempted to challenge
the legality of their detention without trial under Regulation 18B of
the wartime Defense Regulations.' The defendants in the cases were
Sir John Anderson,4 Home Secretary in 1939-1940, and his successor,
Herbert Morrison, who took office in October 1940.1
These cases are regarded as major decisions in English and Com-
monwealth constitutional law. Their counterparts in the United States
are the Supreme Court decisions concerning the treatment, including
detention, of Japanese American citizens after the attack on Pearl
Harbor on December 7, 1941, particularly the decisions in Korematsu
v. United States6 and Ex Parte Endo7, both decided on December 18,
1944. These American cases at least reveal the official reason why the
individuals were detained; their English counterparts give virtually no
indication as to who Liversidge and Greene were, why the authorities
had locked them up, and why the government lawyers had been pre-
pared to resist their attempts to secure liberty. There is a real sense in
which the reported decisions give no indication as to what the litiga-
tion was really about.
I have attempted to recreate the historical context of these cases and
to locate them in the general history of civil liberty during the Second
World War. This is in part a comparative study. Both in Britain, the
original home of the common law, and in the United States of Amer-
ica, its present day principal place of residence, individuals were de-
tained without trial in the name of military necessity or national
security. Some few turned to the courts to vindicate that most basic of
1. [1942] A.C. 206, aff'g [1941] 2 All E.R. 612 (C.A.) (affirming an unreported decision
of Tucker J. which in its turn affirmed a decision of Master Mosley). The litigation concerned
interlocutory proceedings principally to compel the government to answer interrogatories; when
they failed, the action was withdrawn.
2. [1942] A.C. 284, aff'g [1942] 1 K.B. 87 (C.A.). Greene represented himself up to the
hearing in the Court of Appeal.
3. Emergency Powers (Defence) General Regulations, S.R. & 0. 1939, No. 1681, 18B (De-
tention Orders).
4. Anderson, later Viscount Waverley (1882-1958), had been a professional civil servant,
serving as Permanent Under Secretary of State in the Home Office from 1922-1932 before be-
coming Governor of Bengal until 1937. He returned to public life in Britain as a Member of
Parliament, and in 1939 he became the minister in charge of the Home Office. See generally J.
WHEELER-BENNETT, JOHN ANDERSON: VISCOUNT WAVERLY (1962).
5. Herbert S. Morrison, later Baron Morrison of Lambeth (1888-1965), was a prominent
Labour politician brought into Churchill's wartime government. See generally H. MORRISON,
HERBERT MORRISON: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1960); G. JONES, HERBERT MORRISON: PORTRAIT OF A
POLITICIAN (1977).
6. 323 U.S. 214 (944).
7. 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
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all civil rights, the right to personal freedom. They had little success.
In Britain, one individual, a Captain Budd, secured his liberty
through habeas corpus proceedings in May 1941.8 Curiously enough,
the score in the United States seems to have been the same, Mitsuye
Endo having secured her complete liberty through legal action in
1944. 9
The story of detention without trial in America differs from the
story in Britain socially, politically and legally. There are nevertheless
comparisons and contrasts which are not without interest, and per-
haps value. I shall take the British story as my point of departure, and
I must explain that I have not myself engaged in any original research
into the treatment of the Japanese Americans. The subject has been
very fully explored by numerous writers, and I have relied principally
upon Peter Irons' Justice at War, published in 1983.10 As yet, no com-
8. The litigation by Budd which led to his release is reported only in The Times (London),
May 18, 1941, at 9, col. 5. See generally Ex parte Budd, [1941] 2 All E.R. 749 (unsuccessfully
contesting his rearrest), aff'd, [1942] 1 All E.R. 373; Budd v. Anderson, [1943] 2 All E.R. 452
(failed suit for false imprisonment). Additional information is in the Public Record Office
Treasury Solicitor's papers (PRO TS) containing the files of litigation for the Government. See
PRO TS 27/506.
Documents held in the Public Record Office are identified by a system indicating the de-
partment of origin. Materials concerning wartime detention are principally found in files labeled
TS for Treasury Solicitor, HO for Home Office, and CAB for Cabinet Minutes. Within a de-
partmental heading documents are assigned to a class number, such as HO 45, or HO 144, and a
file, and sometimes subfile, number follow. Files are of varying lengths and may contain very
large numbers of individual documents.
9. She was at liberty to leave the detention camp at the time of the litigation but remained,
as she was still prohibited from returning to California because of the exclusion order. P. IRONS,
JUSTICE AT WAR 312 (1983). On Sunday, December 17, 1944, the day before the announcement
of the Supreme Court's decision in her case, the War Department announced that it intended to
release all "[tlhose persons of Japanese ancestry whose records have stood the test of Army
scrutiny during the past two years." Id. at 345.
10. Peter Irons gives a full account of the matter, and I have relied largely upon his re-
search without any personal checking. P. IRONS, supra note 9. Irons' interpretations must be
dealt with carefully, however, as he was counsel for Fred Korematsu, Gordon Hirabayashi and
Minoru Yasui in actions to reverse their criminal convictions through petitions for writs of
coram nobis. These cases were Hirabayashi v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 1445 (W.D. Wash.
1986) (granting the writ and vacating his conviction for failure to report to a Civil Control Sta-
tion and denying petition regarding his violation of curfew), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 828
F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1987) (vacating both convictions) and Korematsu v. United States, 584 F.
Supp. 1406, 1420 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (vacating the conviction but noting that the original decision
remains "the law of the case").
For reviews of Irons' Justice at War, see, e.g., Ball, Politics Over Law in Wartime: The
Japanese Exclusion Cases (Book Review), 19 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 561 (1984) (comments
favorably, and incorporates material from his own research); Cohen, Japanese American Intern-
ment (Book Review), 19 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 781 (1985) (uncritically praises a "fascinating new
book"); Gotanda, "Other Non-Whites" in American Legal History (Book Review), 85 COLUM.
L. REV. 1186, 1192 (1985) (welcomes new factual material, but argues that Irons' "simplistic
moral condemnation lacks the interpretive power to move us beyond previous commentaries"
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prehensive investigation of the British experience has been produced."
Investigation is not easy. Under the policy of freedom of informa-
tion, a massive body of official American records can be consulted. In
Britain, the general rule is that official records are open to public in-
spection in the Public Records Office after thirty years, but files can
be closed for longer periods than this, even up to a century. There is
no public accountability for such delay. One might imagine that Brit-
ish government departments would be happy to encourage the writing
of the history of Britain's finest hour. Nothing of the sort is the case.
Due to an an obsession with secrecy which characterizes the British
government, many papers are still unavailable. This obsession is well
illustrated by recent actions to prevent the publication and sale of Pe-
ter Wright's Spycatcher1 2 and Joan Miller's One Girl's War: Personal
Exploits in MI5"s Most Secret Station. 3 For many months I have been
and that "[h]is historical vision similarly fails to move beyond individuals to institutional dimen-
sions"); Murphy, Book Review, 1 CONST. COMMENTARY 327, 328 (1984) (disputes Irons' charges
of fraud or conspiratorial behavior on the part of the government and ACLU lawyers, suggest-
ing that there were merely defects within the "normal limits of stupidity, negligence, and error
on the part of lawyers"); Sullivan, Book Essay, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 237 (1984) (accepts
Irons' version of the factual record, but contends that Irons goes beyond justifiable inferences in
arriving at his conclusions of blame and responsibility because of the incompatibility of his roles
as historian and advocate); Sunahara, Book Review, 7 Sup. CT. L. REv. 559, 567-68 (1985)
(finds Justice at War an excellent "example of how legal history can be written" though "by no
means neutral," notes the parallel to the British situation in Liversidge, and cautions Canadians
against the complacent belief that the mere presence of the Charter of Liberties "would prevent
a recurrence of the experience of Japanese Canadians during the Second World War").
11. But see N. STAMMERS, CIviL LIBERTIES IN BRITAIN DURING THE 2ND WORLD WAR: A
POLITICAL STUDY (1983) (the fullest treatment to date); A. SIMPSON, RHETORIC, REALITY, AND
REGULATION 18B (1987) (the Child & Co. Oxford Lecture 1987, dealing with many of the ele-
ments of the British detention program addressed here). See also, e.g., B. DOMVLE, FROM ADMI-
RAL TO CABIN Boy (1947); 0. MOSLEY, MY LIFE (1968); R. SKIDEISKY, OSWALD MOSLEY (1975);
R. THuRLow, FASCISM IN BRITAIN: A HISTORY, 1918-1985 (1987) (contains much information
and is well researched); Goldman, Defense Regulation 18, 11 J. OF BRIT. STUD. 120 (1973) (a
sound and perfectly respectable effort, but necessarily imcomplete as it was produced prior to
the release of even the Home Office files now available); Note, Civil Liberties in Great Britain
and Canada During War, 55 HARv. L. REV. 1006 (1942).
12. P. WRIGHT, SPYCATCHER (1987) (the American paperback edition credits the authorship
to "Peter Wright with Paul Greengrass"). Wright's ghosted book is generally familiar as a best-
seller in America, and is widely available in Britain though banned from publication there. The
British government has engaged in unsuccesful efforts to suppress its publication. At the time of
writing litigation concerning the book is still in progress in Britain.
13. J. MILLER, ONE GIRL'S WAR: PERSONAL EXPLOITS IN MI5's MOST SECRET STATION
(1986). Joan Miller, later known as Joanna Phipps, who died in June 1984, worked as an agent
for MI5 ("Military Intelligence 5," the British internal security service) during the war, and in
particular penetrated an organization known as the Right Club; her work helped lead to the
conviction of one Anna Wolkoff, daughter of a Russian emigre, and Tyler Kent, an American
Embassy official, for disloyal activities. See infra note 77. There is nothing in Miller's book
which could conceivably injure British interests today. The book was published in Eire, the Re-
public of Ireland, and in later editions (at 157-60) contains an account of the British attempt to
prevent its publication by court action.
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locked in combat with the Home Office, the British ministry of the
interior, on this matter. While I have secured access to some addi-
tional documents, I have only been granted what is called "privileged
access"; therefore, I have not used this material for this lecture. No
files of the British internal intelligence service, called MI5, have ever
been released. Indeed, until quite recently the very existence of this
institution was always denied by government ministers.m4 Nor have the
records of the Home Defence (Security) Executive, set up under Win-
ston Churchill in 1940 to supervise all matters of internal security,
ever been generally released, though some minutes are accessible. The
Home Office currently holds many files'and subfiles dealing with indi-
vidual detainees, including fifty or so concerned with Ben Greene, to
which I have not yet obtained access."m Some papers have been de-
stroyed, for reasons at which one can only guess, while others have
been "weeded," to use the jargon of this evil trade. Writing the his-
tory of the 1940's is rather like writing medieval history-one is en-
gaged in peering through keyholes. However, certain of the lawyers'
files used in litigated cases contain copies of some documents other-
wise unobtainable and form part of the Treasury Solicitor's papers in
the Public Record Office. 16 Some relevant Home Office files, known
as the Mosley Papers, were released in June of 1985. Various other
documents from withheld files have come to light through copies in
available files, even sometimes in United States records. Mr. Edward
Greene, son of the late Ben Greene, has also kindly given me access to
14. A valuable account of MI5 and its history is given in C. ANDREW, SECRET SERVICE: THE
MAKING OF THE BRITISH INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY (1985). MI5 officers may be either military
officers or civilians, but are not police; thus, arrests are carried out by regular police officers
belonging to the special branch of the metropolitan police which is under the direction of the
Home Office. Andrew provides a bibliography to the considerable popular literature which deals
with MIS. The official multi-volume history of British intelligence during the second war, edited
under the direction of Sir Harry Hinsley, head of St. John's College, Cambridge, and himself a
former intelligence officer, is gravely tainted by a policy of concealment and secrecy, and to date
provides virtually no assistance to anyone interested in detention under Defense Regulation 18B,
as it excludes consideration of internal surveillance. 1, 2 F. HINsLEY, BRITISH INTELLIGENCE IN
THE SECOND WORLD WAR (1979 & 1981). No doubt permission to publish, given in 1979, was
conditional upon accepting certain restrictions imposed by the government. The research for this
work is managed by the Cabinet Office. In the wake of the Spycatcher controversy, a history of
MI5 that Hinsley wrote with another former intelligence officer, Anthony Simpkins, has had its
clearance removed, though he has permission to release his third volume of the more general
history. Evans, Official MI5 History is Shelved to Save Blushes, The Times (London), Feb. 13,
1988, at 24, col. 1.
15. PRO TS 27/522 is, however, available. The case of Ben Greene is discussed in A. MAS-
TERS, THE MAN WHO WAS M, at 141-67 (1984); J. MILLER, supra note 13, at 94; R. TmURLow,
supra note 11, at 172, 204, 207, 212, 222.
16. See supra note 8.
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an extensive collection of family papers, and I have gleaned informa-
tion from personal interviews.
Both Great Britain and the United States detained or exercised
lesser forms of control over noncitizen enemy aliens; the numbers in-
volved in both countries were roughly comparable, approaching
30,000 in Britain and from 35,000 to over 40,000 in the United
States.' 7 In Britain, the power to detain such people rested on the
Royal prerogative, and its exercise could not be challenged in the
courts. In the early part of the war a system of classification was
adopted, and only very few individuals were actually detained.'" On
May 10, 1940, Winston Churchill assumed office while the war was
going very badly indeed. Denmark, Norway, Belgium, Holland, and,
almost incredibly, France fell to German military might and the sense
of impotence it generated. The British army in Europe was perforce
evacuated from the beaches of Dunkirk in late May and early June.
Located within artillery range and separated from England by only
some twenty miles of sea, enemy forces were preparing to invade.
There was widespread, if erroneous, belief that German success had
been assisted by a Fifth Column of collaborators, spies, and sabo-
teurs. I can recall the general belief in the ubiquity of spies and
agents, and this even in the rather remote Yorkshire village of my
childhood. It was in this context that, in June 1940, the government
adopted a wholesale policy of interning enemy aliens. Many of these
aliens were refugees, often Jews, fleeing from Europe, and the policy
met opposition, particularly after the German U-boat commander,
Gunther Prien, on July 2, 1940, sank the liner Arandora Star, killing
17. For a contemporary analysis of the treatment of aliens see Note, Alien Enemies and
Japanese Americans: A Problem in Wartime Control, 51 YALE L.J. 1316 (1942). As to the num-
bers of aliens detained, Neil Stammers gives the figure of 27,000 in Britain, but notes that war-
time conditions prevented accurate compilation of statistics. N. STAIAERS, supra note 11, at 34.
In its statistical report on the relocation program, the War Relocation Authority gave the num-
ber of foreign born evacuees under its control as 38,709 on January 1, 1943, and noted an
additional 50 already on indefinite leave, for a total of 38,759. WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY,
THE EVACUATED PEOPLE: A QUANTITATIVE DESCRIPTION 100 (1946). The Army's final report
indicated that there were 41,089 alien Japanese on the West Coast prior to the evacuation, and
gave the impression that all would be subject to evacuation, if not internment. UNITED STATES
DEP'T OF WAR, FINAL REPORT: JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST: 1942, at 84
(1943). Nanette Dembitz, who, according to P. IRONS, supra note 9, at 119, served as a staff
attorney on the Alien Enemy Control Unit of the Justice Department, suggests that approxi-
mately 42,000 of those subject to restraints were aliens. Dembitz, Racial Discrimination and the
Military Judgment: The Supreme Court's Korematsu and Endo Decisions, 45 COLUM. L. REV.
175 (1945).
18. P. GILLMAN & L. GILLMAN, 'COLLAR THE LOT!' 42-46, 56, 150-53 (1980) [hereinafter
GILLMAN].
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some 661 aliens in transit to camps in Canada. 19 By the end of 1940
the policy had in effect been reversed, and in the course of the next
year large numbers of aliens were released while a serious attempt was
made to separate out the minority who could, rationally, be viewed as
a threat.20 So far as Japanese aliens are concerned, around 100 out of
the 500 or so living in Britain were detained in 1942 and, in the main,
repatriated that same year. 2' Although there is nothing to be proud of
in this "bespattered page" of British history, at least it can be said
that political and official pressure quite rapidly moved against its
most objectionable features. Law and the courts played no part what-
ever.
22
The legal position of British subjects was quite different, though the
political context was much the same. During the 1914-1918 war, when
there was violent hostility to persons of German name or nationality,
and even to German dogs, legislation in the form of the Defence of
the Realm Acts had delegated to the government the power to legislate
by Regulation. One such, Regulation 14B, had authorized the deten-
tion of British subjects on the ground of their "hostile origin or asso-
ciations," on the initiative either of the military or an Advisory
Committee. 23 Thus, while they could not be held under the Royal Pre-
rogative, they could be held nonetheless. Very modest use had been
made of this power. The average number of citizens under detention
at any given time was about seventy, though many enemy aliens were
detained. Regulation 14B was, at least initially, only used against peo-
ple who, though technically British subjects, were in substance enemy
19. Prien had become famous when, on October 14, 1939, he penetrated the British fleet
anchorage at Scapa Flow in the Orkney Islands off Scotland and sank the battleship Royal Oak.
This was, by any standards, a remarkable feat, and thought at the time to have been made
possible by the collaboration of a spy. The espionage element of the story is now thought to be
wrong. See L. FARAGO, THE GAME OF Ta FoxEs 217-19 (1971).
20. See generally GILLMAN, supra note 18, at 220-23, 230-36, 257-62; R. STENT, A BESPAT-
TERED PAGE? 240-51 (1980).
21. GILLMAN, supra note 18, at 286 (relying on the diary of Lt. Col. A. M. Scott, the com-
mander of the detention camp at the time). See also C. HoLMEs, JoHN BULL'S ISLAND: IMMIGRA-
TION AND BRITISH SOCIETY 1871-1971, at 369 n.206 (1988) (citing HO 215/28, 215/503, HO 214/
56).
22. See generally GILLAN, supra note 18; R. STENT, supra note 20. There were a number of
unsuccessful attempts to challenge detention in the courts. See, e.g., Ex Parte L., [1945] K.B. 7.
The case involved a spy called Leopold Hirsch and his wife Olga, who had been detained in
Trinidad in 1941 on their way to establish an espionage network in South America. Some of
their story can be followed in PRO TS 27/555. They argued that they were not enemy aliens, but
lost.
23. Regulation 14B was made under powers conferred by the Defence of the Realm Act,
1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, ch. 29, § 1 and the Defence of the Realm (No. 2) Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5,
ch. 63, § 1. It was upheld as intra vires in The King ex rel. Zadig v. Halliday, [1916] 1 K.B. 738
(C.A.) aff'd, [1917] A.C. 260.
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aliens. For example, a German woman who had only lived in Britain
for a short time, but had recently married an English husband and
who thus would have acquired citizenship, while protected from the
exercise of the Royal prerogative, could have been detained under
Regulation 14B.24
In 1937, a civil service interdepartmental committee, reporting to
the Committee of Imperial Defence, considered what laws and regula-
tions would be needed for the next war and decided that wider powers
might be needed to deal with pacifists and communists.2 5 The interde-
partmental committee produced a draft bill, authorizing the making
of Defence Regulations by the executive through a mechanism known
as an Order in Council. The bill authorized such delegated legislation
for, among other things, "the detention of persons whose detention
appears to the Secretary of State to be expedient in the interests of the
public safety or the defence of the realm."2 6 The draft regulation al-
lowed the Secretary of State (in effect the Home Secretary)2 7 to make
a detention or restriction order against anyone if the Secretary was
"satisfied . . .that with a view to preventing him acting in any man-
ner prejudicial to the public safety, or the defence of the realm, it is
necessary to do so.''28 Any Order in Council introducing regulations
would come before Parliament and could be rejected by an affirma-
tive vote under a procedure known as a "prayer." Otherwise the regu-
lations would become law.29
There being no power of constitutional review in Britain, the limits
controlling the secret scheme for national security dreamt up by the
interdepartmental committee in 1937 and accepted by the Committee
of Imperial Defence on April 21, 1937, were not legal, much less con-
stitutional in the American sense. The constraints were primarily po-
litical. The planners feared that the scheme might be defeated if
Parliament was able to consider its implications, and for this reason it
24. In the debate in the Commons, John Anderson suggested that the 1939 regulations
would be applied in a similarly restrained manner. 352 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th Ser.) 1863 (1939).
25. The account of the committee, presided over by Sir Claud Schuster, a civil servant in
the Lord Chancellor's Department, is based on PRO HO 45/20206, which discusses the position
in the earlier war, and on PRO CAB 52/3. At this time it was not suggested that fascists would
need to be detained. See generally N. STAMMERS, supra note 11, at 7-33.
26. PRO CAB 52/3.
27. British legislation conferring power upon ministers commonly confers power on "The
Secretary of State" without specifying which one is intended; this enables any such minister to
sign and authorize action in the event of illness or other absence. Of course ministerial powers
are exercised on the advice of professional civil servants, and the minister may simply accept
their advice without any real consideration of the matter.
28. PRO CAB 52/3.
29. Id.
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was thought best to keep the scheme on ice until a crisis arose. There
were further limitations, difficult to separate from political considera-
tions, which arose from vague but significant principles of political
and constitutional morality. These limitations arose in particular from
respect for individual freedom and for the rule of law. The force of
these principles depended upon their acceptance by the governing
elite-ministers, important politicians, and senior civil servants. In a
country which wholly lacks the restraints of a formal constitution,
such conventions assume a particular importance. In the 1937 scheme
these principles found expression in a plan to establish an advisory
committee to review cases of detention and make recommendations to
the Home Secretary. It was to be chaired by a high court judge, or
former judge, and there was to be a right of legal representation be-
fore the committee. It was envisaged that two members of Parliament
would sit with the judge. 0 So, although there was to be executive de-
tention without any proof of wrongdoing, a spirit of legality was to be
infused into the whole business through the advisory committee, a
sort of watchdog protecting freedom.
As hostilities approached, the head of the internal security service,
M15, Vernon Kell, had Brigadier A.W.A. Harker produce a modest
list of fifty potential detainees who would need to be locked up
promptly when war came.3 The Home Office, with respect for the
rule of law, refused his request for detention orders signed in advance
"under a power which," as the Head of the Home Office civil service,
Sir Alexander Maxwell, acidly minuted, "does not at present exist." '3 2
Then in 1939 war came, and the Emergency Powers (Defence) Bill was
rushed through a docile Parliament on August 24, 1939. The govern-
ment faced little trouble, save for an attempt to restore the provision
of the draft bill, deleted from the bill actually submitted to Parlia-
ment, that a High Court Judge would serve as the Chairman of the
Advisory Committee. This attempt failed.33 The right to legal repre-
sentation had also been deleted. Later documents I have seen suggest
that the civil servants may have been fearful that a real judge might
not gracefully accept an advisory role, but I cannot document that
this concern was felt in 1939.14
30. Id. See also N. STAMMERS, supra note 11, at 8-13.
31. See generally C. ANDREW, supra note 14, passim; A. MASTERS, supra note 15, passim;
R. THURLOW, supra note 11, at 182, 200-11. Kell's papers are in the Imperial War Museum; he
was the first head of MI5 and was retired on June 10, 1940. He is usually said to have been
"sacked," but was probably merely retired to make way for a younger man.
32. PRO HO 45/25758 (863044) (letter from Maxwell to Kell, May 20, 1939).
33. 351 PAR. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 63, 74-76, 90-91 (1939).
34. In 1939, the administrative grade of the British civil service contained virtually no per-
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The prepared code of defense regulations was passed into law in
two stages. The less draconian, and thus less controversial regulations
were passed into law by Order in Council on August 25, 1939. The
more draconian, including Regulation 18B, passed into law on Sep-
tember 1 by a second Order in Council, which technically amended
the earlier regulations. In order not to upset the numbering of the first
set of regulations, those added at the second stage were distinguished
by the addition of capital letters; to an original Regulation 18 con-
cerning the designation of approved ports of entry and egress from
the United Kindom was added 18A and our regulation, Regulation
18B.35 The House of Commons rose in revolt at the width and vague-
ness of the power of executive detention. The government bowed to
the political storm and promised to substitute a less objectionable reg-
ulation. 6 If a vote had gone against the government, all the regula-
tions in the second stage would have ceased to be law. On November
sons of university legal education in positions of seniority, save in the Lord Chancellor's Depart-
ment. There were lawyer civil servants, but they were and are employed as lawyers, not as
generalist civil servants. The explanation for this lies in the low status of legal education. This
situation persists today. In the 19th century the position, so far as the Home Office Was con-
cerned, was different; the permanent head was always a lawyer barrister, though normally not
one with a university legal education.
35. Defence Regulations, S.R. & 0. 1939, No. 978 (amending S.R. & 0. 1939, No. 927).
Regulation 18B thus first appears in what is technically an amended version of the Defence
Regulations. Regulations introduced on September 1, 1939 were laid before Parliament on Sep-
tember 5th. This gave an opportunity to object, but the relulations were already law in force.
. 36. 352 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1830-1902 (1939). Herbert Morrison was later to ad-
minister the revised Defence Regulations as Home Secretary, but on their adoption he was not
part of the government and was part of the storm. He challenged the original wording, stating
that it gave the executive "really extraordinarily sweeping powers under which, it seems to me,
anybody whom the Home Secretary did not like could be hanged, drawn and quartered almost
without any reasonable or proper means of defending himself." Id. at 1846. Also instructive is
this passage:
I am not going to use the argument usually put forward as a matter of courtesy that
we do not believe the present Minister would be wicked but that we are afraid his
successors might be. I think that any Minister is capable of being wicked when he as a
body of regulations like this to administer .... Therefore, let us put aside the cant in
which we engage that we are sure the present Home Secretary would not do wrong,
but that we are not so sure of his successors. We believe that the present Home Secre-
tary is capable of being wicked, and, therefore, the House should be guarded and
careful as to the powers which they give to him.
Id. at 1846-47. While he was addressing the original wording of the regulations as a whole, and
not specifically Regulation 18B, given the subjective standard applied by the courts to the re-
quirement that the Secretary have "reasonable cause" to believe that an individual fell under the
terms of Regulation 18B, knowledge of his earlier position probably would have given bitter
amusement to many of those detained under his supervision. Likewise amused might have been
those who heard the home secretary respond to criticism of the detainees' inability to challenge
their anonymous accusers thus: "I dare say that it would be convenient to a lot of people to be
told everything about everybody, but it would not be expedient for the security of the country."
377 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th Ser.) 1257 (1942).
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23, by which time only twenty-six detention orders had been made, an
amended Regulation 18B was promulgated and found acceptable by
the House of Commons. 37
The revised regulation differed from the first version in two impor-
tant respects. First, it listed categories of people who could be de-
tained. Detainees had "to be of hostile origin or associations or to
have been recently concerned in acts prejudicial to the public safety or
the defence of the realm or in the preparation or instigation of such
acts." 38 Administrative practice treated all this as producing two basic
categories-those of hostile association and/or origins on the one
hand, and those who had recently been getting up to prejudicial acts
on the other.39 Second, the Home Secretary had to have "reasonable
cause to believe" both that the detainee fell into one or more catego-
ries, and that "by reason thereof" it was necessary to detain him or
her.40 Furthermore, under the scheme, detained individuals were to
have the right to make representations to the Home Secretary and to
oJbject to detention and place their case before the Advisory Commit-
tee. The committee chairman had a duty "to inform the objector of
the grounds on which the order was made against him and to furnish
him with such particulars as are in the opinion of the chairman suffi-
cient to enable him to present his case." ' 4' Thus, on detention the de-
tainee had to be informed of his rights, such as they were. In addition,
the Home Office had to make monthly statistical returns to Parlia-
ment, indicating how many orders had been made and people de-
tained and released (though not giving names), and setting out the
degree to which the recommendations of the Advisory Committee had
been acted upon. 42 A very well-known barrister, Norman Birkett, was
made chairman of the Advisory Committee. 43 To emphasize its inde-
37. Emergency Powers (Defence) General Regulations, S.R. & 0. 1939, No. 1681, 18B(l)
(replacing S.R. & 0. 1939, No. 978, 18B(l)). In fact, detentions began before Regulation 18B
was revised, and as of December 1939, 24 individuals then held had been interned under the
original Regulation. Of these, 12 were suspected of espionage. PRO HO 45/25758 (863044/17).
38. Emergency Powers (Defence) Geperal Regulations, S.R. & 0. 1939, No. 1681, 18B(l).
39. PRO HO 45/25758. This file is the principal source for the ensuing discussion of the
administration of Regulation 18B.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Emergency Powers (Defence) General Regulations, S.R. & 0. 1939, No. 1681, 18B(6).
43. William Norman Birkett, later Baron Birkett (1883-1962) was featured in many causes
celebres in the period 1920-1939. Birkett became a judge on November 24, 1941, and continued
to act as Chairman. H. MONTGOMERY-HYDE, NORMAN BIRKETT 469-70 (1964). He was later a
Lord Justice of Appeal and eventually a House of Lords judge. Birkett appears to have been a
somewhat compliant individual, who maintained a cordial relation with the Home Office offi-
cials. In 1957, he issued an official report on telephone tapping which assisted in the legitimation
of this practice, long organized by the Home Office and now much in use in Britain. COMMITTEE
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pendence from the Home Office the Committee operated from dis-
tinct premises, and its Secretary was not a Home Office civil servant,
but a retired diplomat, G.P. Churchill, who did the job for free."
Let us now compare what happened in America. On December 7,
1941, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor. The formal steps which led to the
detention of American citizens were introduced, not in the relatively
placid conditions of Britain in 1939-when, as I recall, we were cheer-
fully singing the popular song:
We'll hang out the washing on the Siegfried Line;
if the Siegfried Line's still there
-but in conditions of alarm at times bordering on panic, and worse.
The states along the Pacific coastline, where the next attack was
feared, contained many people of Japanese ancestry who had long
been the target of feelings of racial hostility, and this hostility com-
bined readily with invasion fears to drive reason from the field.
Introduced in this very different context the formal legal steps em-
ployed to legitimize military control, mass displacement, and eventual
internment of Japanese Americans were, in comparison to their Brit-
ish equivalents, perfunctory. No attempt was made to set clear limits
to the powers conferred. One can only speculate, but if the British
Defence Regulations had been brought to Parliament in desperate
conditions rather than in the placid, if tense, early days of the war,
OF PRIVY COUNCILLORS, INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS, 1957, CMND SER. 4, No. 283. Bir-
kett was actually the second chairman of the Advisory Committee. The first, Walter Monkton,
had only served briefly, and by the time the Commons addressed the Order in Council, October
31, 1939, less than two months after the initial submission of the Defence Regulations, Sir John
Anderson named both men as acting as chairman alternately. 352 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.)
1852-1856 (1939). Monkton was also a well-known barrister, having been the Duke of Windsor's
adviser during the abdication crisis.
44. PRO HO 283/22 contains G.P. Churchill's account of the Advisory Committee's work.
The Committee operated at first from 6 Burlington Gardens in London and later from the Ber-
ystede Hotel (still in business) at Ascot, near the winter quarters of Bertram Mills Circus, where
detainees were held, replacing the elephants, tigers, and clowns who had resided there out of
season in happier times. In March, 1941, G.P. Churchill was replaced by Miss Jenifer M. Fischer
Williams, then a civil servant in the Home Office. The change in the staffing of the Committee
represented a move towards incorporating it in the Home Office. Formerly private secretary to
Alexander Maxwell, the Permanent Under Secretary at the Home Office, Miss Williams had
worked on subjects connected with MI5 activities prior to her appointment to the Committee. In
1941 she married H.L.A. Hart, then a lawyer employed by Mi15, though not in connection with
detention, who after the war became an academic in Oxford. This discussion of the operations
of the Committee is is also based upon PRO HO 283/21, 283/22, HO 45/25754, TS 27/495, 27/
501, 27/513, 27/514, and 27/542. The Home Office files deal with the procedures of the Advi-
sory Committee generally, while the Treasury Solicitors' files provide information based on the
handling of specific cases litigated in the courts. See also B. DoMVuLE, supra note 11; 0. MOSLEY,
supra note 11; R. SKIDELSKY, supra note 11; R. THURLOW, supra note !1, at 180-232.
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perhaps they too would have been more perfunctory. As we shall see,
once conditions in Britain became alarming in May and June of 1940,
a definite air of muddle likewise became apparent. Be that as it may,
on February 19, 1942, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order
Number 9066, which provided that military commanders might pre-
scribe military areas from which "any or all persons may be excluded,
and with respect to which the right of any person to enter, remain in,
or leave shall be subject to whatever restrictions the Secretary of War
or the appropriate Military commander may impose in his discre-
tion. ' 45 The stated reason for the order was "the protection against
espionage and against sabotage of national-defense material, national-
defense premises, and national-defense utilities. ' '4 6 On March 21,
1942, Congress gave teeth to orders made under the executive order by
General DeWitt, the west coast military commander by enacting Pub-
lic Law 503. The Act made it a misdemeanor for anyone knowingly to
"enter, remain in, leave, or commit any act in any military area or
military zone prescribed by any military commander . . . contrary to
the restrictions applicable to any such area or zone or contrary to the
order of. . . any such military commander." 47
Between March and May of 1942, General DeWitt issued a number
of proclamations making the western states into military zones. Per-
sons of Japanese ancestry, whether aliens or citizens, were subjected
to a curfew and other restrictions. They were also progressively ex-
cluded from defined zones and told to report to collecting points for
evacuation. By the end of October 1942, around 112,000 Americans
of Japanese ancestry, over 65,000 of them United States citizens, were
detained in camps outside the supposedly threatened zones.4 8 Many
45. Exec. Order No. 9,066, 3 C.F.R. 1092 (1938-1943).
46. Id.
47. Act of March 21, 1942, ch. 191, 56 Stat. 173 (1942). No indication was given during the
perfunctory debate on the bill that it was to be the basis for a policy of mass detention. P.
IRONS, supra note 9, at 65-68. Nor was there any such notice in the text of the brief act:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress Assembled, that whoever shall enter, remain in, leave, or commit
any act in any military area or military zone prescribed, under the authority of an
Executive order of the President, by the Secretary of War, or by any military com-
mander designated by the Secretary of War, contrary to the restrictions applicable to
any such area or zone or contrary to the order of the Secretary of War or any such
military commander, shall, if it appears that he knew or should have known of the
existence and extent of the restrictions or order and that his act was in violation
thereof, be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be liable to a fine of
not to exceed $5,000 or to imprisonment for not more than one year, or both for each
offense.
Act of March 21, 1942, ch. 191, 56 Stat. 173 (1942).
48. P. IRONS, supra note 9, at 68-73.
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Americans of Japanese ancestry were simply American citizens; others
enjoyed dual nationality under then Japanese law.49 The justification
advanced for their exculsion and detention was that the Japanese
American population contained, to a greater extent than any other de-
fined group, individuals who were potentially disloyal and who might
engage in espionage and sabotage, and further that it was not possible
to identify who they were, or at least not possible to do so quickly.
Therefore, it was all too successfully claimed, that the only solution
was to control, evacuate, and, eventually, detain them all.50 Plainly,
this justification reflected the racial stereotype of the inscrutable ori-
ental. In conformity with this prejudice no attempt was made after
hostilities began to establish individual potential for disloyalty, much
less any sort of disloyal action. The results of earlier efforts to deter-
mine individual culpability or potential for such disloyalty on the part
of Japanese Americans were ignored." The detainees were to spend
between two and three years in camps under very disagreeable condi-
tions. 52
What now seems bizarre is the absence, both in the Executive Order
and in the legislation, of any explicit reference whatsoever to the es-
tablishment of a system of detention of citizens-without trial, with-
out set term, and without any kind of safeguards. It seems to me quite
inconceivable that anyone voting to enact Public Law 503 in 1942
could have supposed from its text that they were approving a system
of mass detention. Nor was this indicated as the policy at the time.13
By comparison with what happened on the west coast, the use of
Regulation 18B in Britain was modest in the extreme. By the end of
April 1940 only 136 orders had been made, and only fifty-eight per-
sons remained in detention.14 In the whole course of the war only
49. The legal background to internment and the law on dual citizenship is discussed fully in
Note, Alien Enemies and Japanese Americans: A Problem of Wartime Control, 51 YALE L.J.
1316 (1942).
50. See P. IRONS, supra note 9, at 52-54.
51. Peter Irons details FBI and Naval Intelligence efforts to evaluate the loyalty of particu-
lar groups and individuals within the Japanese alien community prior to the war. A list with
between 2000 and 3000 names was compiled. However, with the commencement of hostilities,
the intelligence community's conclusions as to the scope of potential espionage activity were
disregarded, as was its belief that the loyalty of Japanese Americans could be determined on
individual grounds. Id. at 19-22, 280-87.
52. Id. at 73-74.
53. See J. TENBROEK, E. BARNHART, & F. MATSON, PREJUDICE, WAR AND THE CONSTITU-
TION 111-16 (1964) [hereinafter J. TENBROEK].
54. REPORT BY TRE SECRETARY OF STATE AS TO THE ACTION TAKEN UNDER REGULATION 18B
OF THE DEFENCE (GENERAL) REGULATIONS, 1939, DURING THE PERIOD IST APRIL, 1940, TO 30TH
APRIL, 1940 (May 21, 1940), reprinted in 4 BRITISH SESSIONAL PAPERS: HOUSE OF COMMONS 1939-
1940, at 203 (for Sept. 1939 through Sept. 1940). The other reports by the Secretary of State are
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1,847 detention orders were made," along with an uncertain number
of restriction orders imposing limits on residence, requirements to re-
port changes of address, and other requirements, such as curfew. A
longer list of detainees, the "invasion list," existed, but was never im-
plemented. 6 Early use of detention was largely confined to persons
thought to be involved in espionage. Though some few members of
the Irish Republican Army were arrested, they were released on condi-
tion that they return home.17
The administrative arrangements in the early years of the war were
characterized by a sort of bureaucratic elegance. The initiative for de-
tention normally came from M15, though it could originate with the
police, who made a recommendation to the Home Office. This con-
verted the human being involved into the essential subject matter of
bureaucratic action-a file. The civil servants in the relevant depart-
ment of the Home Office then passed the file up the bureaucracy with
recommendations noted on the docket. If they favored an order, it
would end up on the Home Secretary's desk, passing first over the
desk of the Permanent Under Secretary, Sir Alexander Maxwell. A
draft order would be attached for signature. Sir John Anderson would
then sign an order, after having looked at the file and no doubt dis-
cussing any points which arose with his officials. The order would be
sent in triplicate to the local Chief Constable of Police, and the indi-
vidual would be arrested by a police officer. Elaborate arrangements
were set up to ensure that the detainee knew of his or her rights, and
the individual received one copy of the order. A second copy would be
given to the Prison Governor to justify his receipt of the detainee, and
also reprinted in the published Parliamentary Papers. 4 BRITISH SESSIONAL PAPERS: HOUSE OF
COMMONS 1940-1941, at 247 (for Oct. 1940 through Sept. 1941); 4 BRITISH SESSIONAL PAPERS:
HOUSE OF COMMONS 1941-1942, at 221 (for Oct. 1941 through Aug. 1942); 4 BRITISH SESSIONAL
PAPERS: HOUSE OF COMMONS 1942-1943, at 345 (for Sept. 1942 through Sept. 1943); 3 BRITISH
SESSIONAL PAPERS: HOUSE OF COMMONS 1943-1944, at 227 (for Oct. 1943 through Oct. 1944); 5
BRITISH SESSIONAL PAPERS: HOUSE OF COMMONS 1944-1945, at 75 (for Nov. 1944 through May 9,
1945)). These statistics may not be entirely accurate for the peak period of internment in the
summer of 1940; there has been some suspicious weeding of files in the Public Record Office,
and there is no doubt that the staff was then overworked. However, there is no reason to doubt
that the figures are more or less right.
55. See PRO HO 45/25758.
56. See PRO HO 45/25718.
57. There are brief but clear references to this in the REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE AS
TO THE ACTION TAKEN UNDER REGULATION 18B OF THE DEFENCE (GENERAL) REGULATIONS, 1939,
DURING THE PERIOD IST SEPTEMBER, 1939, TO 30TH NOVEMBER, 1939 (Dec. 1939) and the REPORT
OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE AS TO THE ACTION TAKEN UNDER REGULATION 18B OF THE DEFENCE
(GENERAL) REGULATIONS, 1939, DURING THE PERIOD lST SEPTEMBER, 1939, TO 31ST DECEMBER,
1939 (Jan. 1940) reprinted in 4 BRITISH SESSIONAL PAPERS: HOUSE OF COMMONS 1939-1940, at
203, 205. The 11 individuals concerned were among the first detained. Returns after December
1940 make no special mention of detainees of Irish nationality.
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the third copy returned to the Home Office endorsed with a note of
the arrest and information as to the results of a personal search. 8 The
case would then, if the detainee wished, go to the Advisory Commit-
tee. So far as I can judge, the Committee made the first extensive
inquiry into the strength of the case made by M15, since MI5 recom-
mendations were normally accepted by the officials in the Home Of-
fice unless they were on their face peculiar. The policy was to detain
first and review later.
At this point, a document called the "Reasons for Order," setting
out the "grounds" for the order and the "particulars," was pre-
pared.5 9 This was done by lawyers, recruited to work in M15 during
the war, rather than by regular MI5 officers. These lawyers worked in
a London prison, Wormwood Scrubs, early in the war, and later in
Blenheim Palace near Oxford.6 They had access to M15's extensive
personal files.6 I This "Reasons for Order" was given to the detainee.
The "grounds" were legalistic and consisted of a recital of the rele-
vant terms of Regulation 18B, indicating that the detention was based
on "hostile associations" or "acts prejudicial" or whatever. The
"particulars" consisted of a laconic statement amplifying the
grounds, but never giving any indication of the evidentiary basis relied
upon by MI5.
MI5 also prepared, for the use of the Committee, a much fuller
document which the detainee did not see, called the "Statement of the
Case." The "particulars" were an expurgated version of this longer
document, normally produced by MI5's lawyers, but occasionally
written by the Chairman himself or the Secretary. Using the "State-
ment of the Case," the Committee, usially in the person of Norman
58. The procedures were governed by a letter known as "the Maxwell letter," which had
been drafted by Sir Alexander Maxwell and sent to all chief officers of police. Maxwell was the
permanent head of the Home Office from 1938-1948. This letter is available in PRO TS 27/511.
In Britain, the Metropolitan police force is under the direct control of the Home Office; other
police forces are, by a sort of fiction, supposed not to be under ministerial control, though in
reality they are regularly directed by the Home Office, which issues policy circulars. One of the
advantages of the fiction is that the Home Secretary is not treated as responsible for provincial
police forces.
59. The following discussion draws particularly on PRO TS 27/495, 27/507, 27/513, 27/
514, and 27/542, but also reflects information obtained in personal interviews with participants
and from the run of files found in the Public Record Office.
60. In the records of the Public Record Office, I have noted S.H. Noakes, E.B. Stamp.
H.P.J. Milmo, G. St. C. Pilcher, and A.A. Gordon-Clark (better known as the popular novelist
Cyril Hare) all of whom subsequently became judges, and J.L.S. Hale and T.M. Shelford, who
did not. Other lawyers, such as H.L.A. Hart, who worked for MI5, were not engaged in this
work. This list is only partial, but serves to indicate the character of MI5's legal department.
61. On these files, to which there was a card index, see C. ANaxw, supra note 14, at 241-
43, 478-79. Some were lost to German bombing in November of 1940. See also A. MASTERS,
supra note 15, at 113; J. MILLER, supra note 13, at 55.
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Birkett, conducted an inquisitorial examination of the detainee. The
detainees had the right to make whatever points they wished, so long
as they could get a word in edgewise, for Birkett, like many English
barristers and some law professors, was a powerful talker. The pro-
ceedings have been described as combining elements of a court martial
with an ecclesiastical tea party. 62 The detainee was never allowed to
confront or question witnesses, and apparently only very rarely were
any witnesses seen even in the absence of the detainee. Virtually never
did the Committee, so far as I can tell, see M15 agents, upon whose
investigations many cases depended, or even the agents' case officers.
A transcript was made, and the Committee then made its recommen-
dation, principally on its feeling for the case after the examination, in
a written report. It also might make suggestions, carefully distin-
guished from its formal advice, since the rate of compliance with
suggestions was not required to be reported to Parliament.
Birkett explained in a memorandum at the time that all doubts were
resolved "in favour of the country and against the individual. ' 63 He
also explained that "the absence of legal assistance placed the appel-
lant in no real disability, for they [the committee members] regarded it
as a duty to assist the appellant to formulate and express the answers
he desired to make." 64 No doubt this explained the happy relationship
between the Committee and the Home Office. While Sir John Ander-
son was the Minister, that is until early October of 1940, all recom-
mendations from the Committee, whether for release, release subject
to restrictions, or continued detention, were accepted. In effect, An-
derson was delegating the decisions to the Committee, which indeed
did recommend release in a considerable number of cases. Given the
fairly short interval between detention and appearance before the Ad-
visory Committee, a matter of weeks only, the system did not operate
too badly, and its operation was, at this period, scrupulously correct
within the legal framework provided by the Defence Regulations. The
principal difficulty faced by detainees was that under this procedure
the case against them was never really revealed. The Committee did
62. See R. THURLOW, supra note 11, at 215-16.
63. PRO HO 45/25754 (memorandum of Jan. 10, 1940). Birkett's memorandum dealt with
the evaluation of particular cases, but is strikingly paralleled by a memorandum prepared for
United States Attorney General Biddle as part of the American policy making process. "'In time
of national peril any reasonable doubt' about the loyalty of Japanese Americans 'must be re-
solved in favor of action to preserve the national safety,' [Benjamin] Cohen [one of Biddle's
advisors] and his colleagues wrote." P. IRoNs, supra note 9, at 54 (quoting Memorandum, "The
Japanese Situation on the West Coast," File 146-13-7-2-0, Records of the Alien Enemy Control
Unit, Department of Justice).
64. PRO HO 45/25754 (memorandum of Jan. 10, 1940). Lawyers were allowed to assist a
detainee in preparing his or her case.
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not in any real sense investigate the case for or against the detainees,
nor could it direct any investigation by MI5, which it did not control.
All it did was interrogate the detainees and listen to their answers, and
on this basis, and on the "Statement of the Case," express opinions.
In early summer of 1940 the "phoney war" ended and the real war
began, producing conditions in Britain which appeared as, or more,
desperate than conditions were to appear in America after the shock
of Pearl Harbor. Winston Churchill took office on May 10, and on
May 15 the policy of mass internment of aliens was authorized by the
Cabinet; Churchill favored this at the time but later came round to a
more liberal view. 65 The scale of detention under Regulation 18B also
rose sharply in June and July of 1940 under these policies, again ini-
tially supported by Churchill. 66 At the end of May there were 131 de-
tainees, at the end of July, 1378. The number remained above a
thousand until the end of 1940, and then fell steadily as detainees were
released. 67 In late 1940 and 1941 considerable conflict arose between
MI5 and the Advisory Committee, which MI5 thought was far too
liberal, but the Cabinet backed the Committee and release contin-
ued.68 By the end of 1942, there were 486 detainees, by the end of
1943, 266, by the end of 1944, 65, and at the end of the War in Eu-
rope, 11, of whom 10 were at once released and 1, in fact an alien,
deported. 69 These are dramatically below the American figures, and
on average they involved shorter periods of detention. Most detainees
were kept in camps, but a small number of prominent detainees and
individuals regarded as difficult to control were housed in prisons, no-
tably Brixton Prison in London. Offrcially, those interned under Reg-
ulation 18B were held in reasonable conditions, but in reality their
situation was one of some considerable squalor. 70 The detained aliens
65. PRO CAB 67/7. At first the Home Office resisted any considerable increase in the scale
of detention, but Anderson had to bow to political pressure. GILMAN, supra note 18, at 131-45;
N, STAMMERS, supra note 11, at 34-62. See also M. GILBERT, FINEST HOUR: WINSTON S. CHUR-
CHILL 1939-1941, at 342, 420, 485, 491-98 (1983) [hereinafter FINEST HOUR]; M. GILBERT, ROAD
TO VICTORY: WINSTON S. CHURCHILL 1941-1945, at 566-67 (1986) (referring to release of Sir Os-
wald Mosley).
66. Figures are taken from the returns to Parliament. See supra note 54.
67. See N. STAMMERS, supra note 11, at 66-68.
68. This can be followed in PRO HO 45/25754. By this time the original Advisory Commit-
tee had taken to sitting in three panels to enable it to catch up on the work involved.
69. This alien may have been Leopold Hirsch. A number of individuals of uncertain citizen-
ship were detained under 18B, rather than under the prerogative, so as to be on the safe side if
the legality of their detention was challenged. Hirsch was such an individual, since he, as a Jew,
had been deprived of his German citizenship by Nazi racial laws and, if the English courts were
to recognize these laws, he would not have ranked as an enemy alien. PRO TS 27/555. See also
Ex parte L., [1945] K.B. 7.
70. INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE WITH REGARD TO THE DETENTION IN
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were also kept in bad and sometimes appalling conditions.71
The paucity of available records makes it extraordinarily difficult to
discover just which of its citizens the British government saw fit to
detain without benefit of trial. Nor is it possible to make a detailed
breakdown into categories. No nominal roll exists, and an internal
history written by a Home Office civil servant after the war, originally
intended to form part of a general departmental history, has, so I am
assured, been destroyed.7 2 Why this act of vandalism occurred, or who
authorized it, I have no idea. However, the largest single group of
detainees consisted of former members of the British Union of Fas-
cists, the leading fascist party, led by Sir Oswald Mosley. In 1939, it
had around 20,000 members, many of whom were not very active.
7 3
On May 22, 1940, the Cabinet decided to intern twenty-five to thirty
leading lights of the party, including Sir Oswald and his wife.7 4 The
probable reason for this, it has been suggested, was not the belief that
Mosley and his followers were disloyal-they were indeed in the main
ostentatiously patriotic. Nor was the reason their anti-Semitism. It
was the belief, given the risk of invasion and the grim state of the war,
that Mosley, in collaboration with a group of other fellow travellers
of the right, hoped to arrange a negotiated peace with Hitler, one that
PRISON ESTABLISHMENTS OF PERSONS DETAINED IN PURSUANCE OF REGULATION 18B, 1939, CMND.
SER. 3, No. 6162, reprinted in 10 BRITISH SESSIONAL PAPERS: HOUSE OF COMMONS, 1939-1940, at
87 (referring to the custodial rather than punitive purpose of their incarceration). For a particu-
larly vivid account of the conditions facing the detainees at Brixton, see generally B. DoMVILE,
supra note 11, detailing the indignities the author faced there.
71. See R. STENT, supra note 20, at 83-94, 134-55.
72. 1 know of only two published or available breakdowns later than a list compiled in
December 1939 of 24 persons detained under the original form of 18B. In a debate in November
1941, Herbert Morrison said that of the 1,769 persons detained, 902 were detained on grounds of
hostile origin or association, 753 were detained under 18B(1A) as members of the British Union
of Fascists, and 114 were held for acts prejudicial to the realm, at least 14 of these having been
associated with the Irish Republican Army (IRA). Of those totals detained, only 375 with hostile
origins or associations, 217 Fascists, and 71 accused of engaging in prejudicial acts, including the
IRA members, were still in detention. 376 PARE. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 849-52 (1941). Morrison
later reported that of the 529 detainees remaining in July 1942, 322 were persons of hostile
origins or associations, 14 were detained under 18B(1A) as members or former members of the
British Union of Fascists, and 66 were detained for acts prejudicial. 381 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th
ser.) 1516 (1942).
73. Sir Oswald Ernold Mosley (1896-1980) was a brilliant, if maverick, figure in British
politics, starting life as a left-winger and then moving to the far right. See 0. MOSLEY, supra
note I I (largely a work of self-justification); N. MOSLEY, RULES OF THE GAME (1982) (more relia-
ble, though by his son). An excellent account of Mosley's party is given by Richard Thurlow.
Thurlow made extensive use of the large collection of papers connected with internment released
to the Public Record Office in 1985 and known as "The Mosley Papers," though many do not
in fact concern Mosley or his followers. These papers appear to have been extensively weeded,
and one can only speculate as to why some have been released and others withheld. R. THUR-
LOW, supra note 11, at 92-162, 305 (excellent guide to bibliographic information).
74. PRO CAB 65/7; see also FINEST HOUR, supra note 65, at 485-86.
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would put Mosley in office as Prime Minister." It is possible that the
Duke of Windsor, formerly King Edward VII, was involved in some
way in such a scheme, a fact which, if true, would do much to explain
the official resistance to disclosure of records. 76 Much information on
neofascist groups, particularly on an organization known as The
Right Club, came to light on May 20, 1940, when intelligence officers
searched the apartment of one Tyler Gatewood Kent, an American
cipher clerk engaged in disloyal activities in the United States Em-
bassy. This disclosure of rightist espionage may have triggered ac-
tion. 77
What is, however, a little implausible about this explanation is that,
had the war gone even worse, the people who would have likely nego-
tiated a peace would surely not have been Oswald Mosley and his curi-
ous and politically insignificant bedfellows, such as Admiral Domvile
and the Marquess of Tavistock, but Conservative Party ministers,
particularly Lord Halifax and Mr. R.A.B. Butler at the Foreign Of-
fice. 7 Even after Winston Churchill came to power, the Foreign Of-
fice continued to explore possibilities of a peace settlement. I incline
to the view that since virtually nothing could be done to harm Hitler
until the United States could be brought into the war, Churchill's en-
thusiasm for internment in 1940 was driven by his desire to appear to
be taking ruthless and vigorous action. Thereby he sought to counter-
75. This is the view taken in R. TfjURLOW, supra note 11, at 188-232. If so, the impetus for
the detention would have come from MIS, the case officers particularly concerned being either
Maxwell-Knight or Anthony Blunt, who later turned out to have been a Soviet agent. Evidence
for the secret meetings exists in the diaries of Admiral Domvile, now in the National Maritime
Museum. I have not yet had an opportunity to consult these, and rely on Thurlow. Id. at 164,
180-86. Alternatively, the Gillmans suggest that political battles within the government were re-
sponsible for the handling of the Fascists. The opponents of Sir John Anderson are credited with
perhaps having orchestrated his ouster in part through the management of the Tyler Kent and
Mosley affairs. Gn..MAN, supra note 18, at 115-29.
76. For information on the Duke's activities, see FINEST HOUR, supra note 65, at 698-709,
894, 1091 n.l. See also A. CAVE BROWN, "C" THE SECRET LIFE OF SIR STEWART MENZIES,
SPYMASTER TO WINSTON CHURCHILL 272-76, 185-86, 676 (1987). After the war, in 1946 or 1946,
Anthony Blunt is said to have recovered from Germany some documents embarrassing to the
Royal Family, presumably connected with Blunt's wartime surveillance of British right-wing
groups in 1940. See C. PINCHER, Too SECRET Too LONG 451 (1984) (Pincher relies on undis-
closed sources. One of his sources was Peter Wright, author, or at least source, of Spycatcher);
P. WRIGHT, supra note 12, at 273.
77. See L. FARAGO, supra note 19, at 338, 341-45; A. MASTERS, supra note 15, at 86-87; J.
MILLER, supra note 13, at 21-38; R. THUsuJow, supra note 11, at 163-232. For an account of the
sentences passed (the trial was in camera), see The Times (London), Nov. 8, 1940, at 2, col. 3.
There is a transcript of the trial in PRO HO 45/25741, and one in the Yale University Library.
See also FINEST HOUR, supra note 65, at 485-86. It must be noted that much of the literature of
espionage and security during the war period is of a popular nature, and of necessity makes
bricks with little straw. Such information as does exist tends to be recycled.
78. See FINEST HOUR, supra note 65, at 190, 598-99, 607, 694-95.
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act the view adopted by, among others, United States Ambassador
Joseph Kennedy, that Britain would soon capitulate. This ruthlessness
was demonstrated most dramatically by the decision to engage and
destroy major elements of the French fleet at Mers el Kebir and else-
where early in July. 79 Whether this action was necessary has been
much disputed since; what is clear, however, is that it effectively por-
trayed Britain as serious in its determination to continue the war.
For whatever reason, the government decided to cripple the party
more effectively by detaining a further 350 or so local officials of the
British Union of Fascists. 0 Somewhere around 750 individuals con-
nected with the party, with other right-wing groups, or with resistance
to the war were eventually detained (all numbers are of necessity only
approximate). The discrepancy between the figure of detainees
planned and the larger number actually detained reflects the fact that
detention had gotten out of the control of both the security service
and the Home Office. Those detained apparently included members
of the Link, an organization of Anglo-German friendship founded by
Admiral Sir Barry Domvile, the National Socialist League, a splinter
group of the British Union, and the Right Club, in particular a Mem-
ber of Parliament, Captain Maule Ramsay."1
The detention of members of the British Union could not lawfully
be carried out under the existing Regulation 18B, since the Fascists
were neither guilty of acts prejudicial nor were they of hostile origin
or associations. The Regulation, therefore, was amended on May 22
to permit the detention of members, or past members, or supporters
of certain organizations upon the ground of membership or support
alone. Such organizations had to be, in the view of the Home Secre-
tary, subject to foreign influence or control, or have leaders who had,
or had had, associations with leaders of enemy governments, or who
had sympathized with the system of government of enemy powers.8 2
The new section of the Regulation, 18B(1A), was only used against
the British Union of Fascists, and not against other right-wing or left-
wing groups. But the British Union was, in May of 1940, perfectly
79. Id. at 628-45.
80. See R. Tntrlow, supra note 11, at 211. Thurlow, relying on PRO HO 45/25754, gives
a total of 750.
81. See generally id.; R. GRnFFITHS, FELLOW TRAVELLERS OF THE RIGHT (1980). Captain Ar-
chibald H.M. Ramsay (known as Maule Ramsay) was the only serving member of Parliament
detained; he had been indirectly involved in Tyler Kent's theft of documents from the United
States Embassy. He may have been detained to silence him in Parliament, since he seems to have
opposed Churchill's effort to bring the United States into the war. No peer was ever detained,
though some might well have been-a speculation is that it was feared that a detained peer might
have secured too much support from other members of the House of Lords.
82. Defence Regulations, S.R. & 0. 1940, No. 770, 18B(IA) (Detention Orders).
19881
246 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITYLAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:225
legal. Somewhat belatedly, on June 26, a further Defence Regulation83
allowed the Home Secretary to proscribe organizations, which he did
in the case of the British Union on July 10, 1940.84 By this time some
400 of its members had been detained for membership in a political
party which had been entirely legal at the time they had been associ-
ated with it. Three hundred or more individuals with fascist connec-
tions, but who had never been in the party, were detained under the
original 18B-the inadequacy of the records makes it impossible to
say more than that some stretching of the conceptions of "acts preju-
dicial" or "hostile associations" must necessarily have been in-
volved ."
The second largest identifiable group of detainees, numbering be-
tween 550 and 600, comprised persons of British citizenship but Ital-
ian descent, many being members of the Italian Fascist Party.8 6 Some
may have only recently obtained British citizenship. They were de-
tained after Italy entered the war on June 10, 1940, under an order
signed earlier with the date left blank. Many of these individuals had
joined the party through pressure exerted on relatives in Italy. Conse-
quently membership in the party did not necessarily entail any actual
commitment to fascism. As these persons could be lawfully detained
as being of Italian origin or associations within the terms of the 1939
Regulation 18B, no new regulation was needed.
More than forty years later, around 550 other detainees remain
largely unknown. The forces which led to the selective abridgement of
the forms of ordered liberty were not entirely impartial or lacking in
apparent caprice. Although at least one Communist, John Mason, is
known to have been interned, members of the Communist Party were
not detained simply because of membership. s7 This lack of suppres-
sion warrants some suspicion since, until Germany attacked Russia,
the Communist Party actively opposed the war and would have been a
likely subject of government attention. Although the party headquar-
ters was bugged, Roger Hollis, the responsible MI5 officer, is said to
have assured the Home Office of the loyalty of the Communist
83. Defence Regulations, S.R. & 0. 1940, No. 1078, 18AA (Control and Winding Up of
Certain Organisations).
84. S.R. & 0. 1940, No. 1273.
85. See generally supra note 54 and accompanying text.
86. See PRO TS 27/509, HO 45/25758 (863044/59). The plan was to intern all members of
the Fascio, and all persons of Italian origin between 16 and 70 years of age with less than 20
years residence in Britain. Some 4100 Italians were detained under the prerogative as enemy
aliens.
87. See N. STAMMERS, supra note 11, at 65 (referring to R. CROUCHER, ENGINEERS AT WAR
92-93 (1982)); 369 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 273-74 (1941).
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Party."8 There are those who think that Hollis, later Sir Roger Hollis,
and head of MI5 from 1956 to 1965, was a Russian agent.8 9
The other detainees included some members of the Irish Republican
Army, some persons suspected of espionage or sabotage, a miscellane-
ous group of admirers of Hitler, including some holding weird racial-
ist and conspiratorial views, as well as people who simply seemed to
the police better locked up. One is reminded of the Casablanca Police
Chief's "usual suspects."
One such usual suspect was Harry Sabini, a small-time crook en-
gaged in protection rackets with other members of the "Sabini gang"
on greyhound racing tracks. Sabini has escaped the anonymity which
cloaks most detainees because he sued. Further, while much weeded,
his Home Office file has been released, perhaps because MI5 had
nothing to do with the case. 90 Though his name was Italian, neither he
nor any of his five brothers spoke Italian or had ever visited Italy. He
was detained at the instigation of the London police as being of hos-
tile, that is Italian, associations, which was quite untrue, and the
"particulars" provided to him in the "reasons for order" said that
"Harry Sabini (1) is of Italian origin and associations, (2) is a violent
and dangerous criminal of the gangster type liable to lead internal in-
surrections against the country." 91 On this ludicrous basis, Harry,
who the police conceded had no interest in politics at all, was detained
for some nine months. There were probably numerous other cases in-
volving error or malpractice of one kind or another, though it is im-
possible to be sure. Lord Denning in his memoir, The Family Story,
records another, the detention of a dotty parson. The individual was
probably Rev. H.E.B. Nye, a harmless eccentric. 92
The increased use of detention in the summer of 1940 created many
problems. The officials involved could no longer scrutinize each case,
and the requirement that the Home Secretary should personally "have
reasonable cause to believe" that the detainee fell into a detainable
category became inoperable. In June of 1940, Sir John made 826 or-
88. See K. PHILBY, MY SILENT WAR 103-04 (1968); C. PINCHER, supra note 76, at 56-57.
89. This view has been prominently advanced by the journalist Chapman Pincher. See C.
PINCHER, THEIR TRADE IS TREACHERY (1981); C. PINCHER, supra note 76. It has continued to
receive attention in P. WRIGHT, supra note 12. Hollis was cleared, or rather the case against him
was found not proven by an enquiry in 1974 headed by the former Cabinet Secretary, Sir Burke
Trend; this report has not been published. See C. ANDREW, supra note 14, at 504. Hollis died in
1973. Richard White, former head of M16, and a colleague of Hollis at MI5, has written a
sympathetic account of Hollis' career for the Dictionary of National Biography 1971-1980.
90. PRO TS 27/496A and HO 45/25720. See also The Times (London), Jan. 21, 1941, at 2,
col 7.
91. PRO TS 27/496A and HO 45/25720.
92. T. DENNING, THE FAMILY STORY 130 (1981).
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ders, and if he spent ten minutes on each file, 137 hours of work
would have been involved. 93 A Home Secretary at this period could
not possibly have spent nearly so much time on one minor segment of
administration. Indeed, merely signing the orders became a problem,
and Miss Jenifer M. Fischer Williams and Mr. R.H. Rumbelow, offi-
cials in the Home Office, devised a new monster, the omnibus order,
which required only one signature, but which could have schedules of
names attached to it. The Italians were detained on such an order with
three schedules, the first containing 275 names.94 Later, during litiga-
tion, attempts were made to discover whether Sir John ever actually
saw these schedules, but nobody could remember very clearly; it had
been a very busy time.
Many formal errors were made. The text of an order might not cor-
respond with the grounds provided by the Advisory Committee, and
the grounds might not conform to the particulars. There were errors
as to dates and failures to inform the detainees of their rights. Struc-
turally, the gravest defect in the administration of Regulation 18B was
that the Advisory Committee relied on MI5 to provide the grounds of
the order and the particulars, but MI5 in fact never knew why Sir
John had signed the Order; the Home Office never informed MI5 or
the Advisory Committee as to what had motivated the Home Secre-
tary, so MI5's lawyers just had to guess. 9 Next in gravity was the
meager statement of the case revealed to the detainee which was the
subject of criticism and hence embarrassment. 96 Furthermore, the de-
lay between detention and appearance before the Advisory Committee
grew longer as everyone was overwhelmed with work. Norman Birkett
developed a gastric ulcer worrying about it all, and although the Com-
mittee was divided into a number of panels, the delays became a sub-
ject of criticism as well. The period before the appearance could run
into many months, and some detainees, such as Admiral Domvile,
waited more than a year.97 Nor did bombing help.98 The whole scheme
93. REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE AS TO THE ACTION TAKEN UNDER REGULATION 18B
OF THE DEFENCE (GENERAL) REGULATIONS, 1939, DURING THE PERIOD IST JUNE, 1940, TO 30TH
JUNE, 1940 (July 24, 1940), reprinted in 4 BRITISH SESSIONAL PAPERS: HOUSE OF COMMONS, 1939-
1940, at 203.
94. See PRO TS 27/509, HO 45/25758.
95. See PRO TS 27/507, 542; HO 45/25754.
96. 367 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 868 (1941); 373 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 993-1015
(1941).
97. Domvile, who enjoyed a distinguished career in the Navy, serving as Director of Naval
Intelligence, came to believe in a world conspiracy of Jews and Freemasons responsible for the
war, communism, and his detention. B. DOMVILE, supra note 11, at 70-77, 80-91.
98. MI5 lost many of its records to bombing in November of 1940. See P. WRIGHT, supra
note 12, at 37.
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established by Parliament as a compromise between national security
and civil liberty ceased to operate at all smoothly while the balance
shifted even more markedly toward security.
Although detention of potential spies and saboteurs was generally
acceptable, when detention became more widespread, with the intern-
ment of individuals who claimed with plausibility to be entirely patri-
otic even though they held strange or even offensive political beliefs,
the practice of detention lost much of its semblance of legitimacy.
More particularly, the availability of the catalogue of new offenses
created by the Defence Regulations cast doubt on the need for deten-
tion without trial since troublesome people could perfectly well be
prosecuted in the regular courts. These new offenses went very far-it
became a crime, for example, to spread alarm and despondency. 99 The
authorities had no shortage of weapons for suppressing the disloyal
and the discontented. There existed, though I have not so far been
allowed to see it, a legal opinion by the Attorney General dealing with
the Duke of Bedford, formerly Marquess of Tavistock, which appar-
ently argued that where prosecution was possible for an offense, it
was improper to detain the offender under 18B. If government had
actually accepted this position many detainees would have had to have
been released as illegally detained. 10
One criticism of the use of 18B which could not have been made at
the time, but which can be made now, is more sinister. The breaking
of the German codes employed through the Enigma encoding ma-
chines, in combination with other intelligence sources, meant that the
Prime Minister knew that the threat of invasion was gone by the end
of 1940 and that he would know of any serious revival of this
threat.10 1 Consequently, the justification for many of the internments
of May and June 1940 no longer existed in 1941. It was no doubt
convenient to keep troublesome people locked up, but the practice
could no longer be justified on the ground of necessity. Of course, the
information derived from decoded messages was closely confined for
obvious reasons, so that those administering the system of detention
were left to operate in the dark.
In the United States the situation was far worse than anything in
Britain, both in the scale and duration of detention, and in the ab-
sence of any immediate threat of invasion or attack to the mainland,
99. Defence (General) Regulations, S.R. & 0. 1940, No. 938, 39BA.
100. PRO HO 45/25698 (the Attorney General's opinion is mentioned in a memorandum of
Alexander Maxwell, Jan. 6, 1941).
101. See I HINSLEY, supra note 14, at 189, 254; 2 HINISLEY, supra note 14, at 68, 93-94;
FINEST HOUR, supra note 65, at 878-79, 889-90.
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which might have justified draconian measures.10 2 It is astonishing to
find that only seven individuals out of some 120,000 appear to have
commenced legal proceedings of one kind or another to challenge the
legality of their treatment. 13 I say this because litigation, today at
least, plays so much larger a role in America than in Britain. Perhaps
matters were different in the 1940's. From the suits of these seven liti-
gants four cases eventually reached the Supreme Court, two being de-
cided on June 21, 1943 (the Hirabayashi and Yasui cases) 104 and two
more on December 18, 1944 (the Koramatsu and Endo cases).'05 Only
Mitsuye Endo succeeded, and that only in a somewhat technical sense
as she was already at liberty. 106 The dates of these cases are worth
noticing. The Hirabayashi case challenged the legality of a punish-
ment imposed for a breach of curfew and for failure to report to a
center (called a Civil Control Station, a euphemism for a lock-up), in
May 1942. Presence at the center was a first step towards evacuation
and detention. The Yasui case arose out of punishment for breach of
curfew, the breach having occurred somewhat earlier, in late March.
Neither case addressed the legality of detention, nor the interference
with personal liberty involved in the first step towards detention, turn-
ing up at what might be called the collecting point. So, over a year
after this massive policy of detention had been implemented, the legal
system had not gotten around to finally deciding whether it was lawful
or not.
The Endo case, though successful, decided nothing of general im-
portance; the majority opinion turned on the fact that the litigant was
conceded to be a wholly loyal and law abiding citizen. The Court
ruled that the powers derived from the Executive Order and Act of
1942 conferred no power to detain such a person.10 7 In Koramatsu, the
majority opinion explicitly did not pass on the legality of restraint of
liberty whether in an "assembly center" (that is a collecting point) or
in a camp (euphemistically called a relocation center).108 That is to
102. P. IRONS, supra note 9, at 50-53.
103. Id. at 83, 87, 93, 99, 112, 114. In addition to the four litigants in the cases which
reached the Supreme Court, the Americans of Japanese ancestry who brought suits challenging
the government's infringement of their liberty were Mary Ventura and Ernest and Toki Wakay-
ama.
104. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115
(1943).
105. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Ex Parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
106. P. IRONS, supra note 9, at 344-46; J. TENBROEK, supra note 52, at 99-100, 101-02, 170-
74, 252.
107. Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
108. Some use has been made of the term "concentration camp" in describing the places of
detention of the Japanese Americans. See e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223
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say, it did not decide whether the massive detentions were lawful or
not. The Court's decision was not delivered until well over two years
after Korematsu's confinement began at the Tanforan Assembly Cen-
ter, while he was still on probation and prohibited from returning to
his home after over twenty months of internment. Seemingly oblivious
to the preceeding two years of actual relocation and expressing the
spirit of Dickens's parody of interminable litigation in Bleak House,
Jarndyce v. Jarndyce,'09 the Court in Korematsu said, "It will be time
enough to decide the serious constitutional issues which petitioner
seeks to raise when an assembly or relocation order is applied or is
certain to be applied to him, and we have its terms before us."'' 10
So the war came to an end without the Supreme Court having deter-
mined the real issue. Of course there are technical reasons which can
be used to explain this, and the doctrine of judicial restraint urges
courts not to decide tricky issues until they have to do so. But it seems
to me important, especially for lawyers, not to be overly impressed
with legal technicalities and dogma that produce a situation in which
over 60,000 citizens are held in detention for up to three years, and
indeed released at the end of it, before the legal system has gotten
around to saying whether their detention violated the Constitution or
not.
Since the war, efforts to remedy the wrongs done to the American
citizens of Japanese ancestry have followed two paths. First, Japanese
Americans have fought to have the government pay reparations to the
interned citizens and their heirs in recognition of the illegitimacy of
their confinement. Second, Korematsu, Hirabayashi and Yasui have
instituted court actions to overturn their convictions.
In 1948 the American-Japanese Evacuation Claims Act provided
compensation "for damage to or loss of real or personal property"" 1
but not for personal injury, mental suffering, or for lost profits." 2
(1944); A. BOSWORTH, AMERICA'S CONCENTRATION CAMPS (1967); R. DANIELS, CONCENTRATION
CAMPS USA (1972); R. DRINNON, KEEPER OF THE CONCENTRATION CAMPS: DILON S. MEYER AND
AMERICAN RACISM 321 (1987) (defending the use of the term). Concentration camps, camps
where people were concentrated, were invented by Britain in the Boer War. Dutch South Afri-
cans were concentrated in them as a military measure to impede their support of insurgents.
Conditions were bad in these camps. They, and of course the American camps, were not exter-
mination camps such as Treblinka, nor camps such as Belsen where neglect produced conditions
not much better. It seems improper, therefore, to apply the term "concentration camp" to the
American camps given its modern connotations.
109. C. DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE (1853).
110. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 222.
111. American-Japanese Evacuation Claims Act, ch. 814, 62 Stat. 1231 (1948) (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1981-1987 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984)).
112. Id. § 1982.
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Less than ten percent of the estimated $400 million in evacuee losses
was appropriated, and the settlement process was slow, extending
through 1965.113
Within the ranks of the Japanese American activists, there was a
split between those favoring further efforts to obtain cash reparations
and those intent on a more symbolic form of redress through exposure
of the full details of the internment. 114 In 1976, President Ford issued
"An American Apology," declaring that Executive Order 9066 ended
with the end of World War II, and that "not only was that evacuation
wrong, but Japanese Americans were and are loyal Americans." '" 5
The sentiment was nice, but the effect negligible: nothing was done
for the internees, and no specific admissions were made.
In 1980, the factions within the Japanese American community
united to support the establishment of a Commission on Wartime Re-
location and Internment of Civilians. 116 The Commission had a dual
purpose: to engage in extensive factfinding, and to "recommend ap-
propriate remedies."" 7 The Commission held hearings and took testi-
mony from participants, both internees, and interners. It produced a
report on the internment conditions and political background and is-
sued recommendations as to redress." 8 These findings were the
grounds for the Civil Liberties Act of 1988." 9 This Act requests that
the Attorney General recommend to the President the pardon of those
convicted of violating the wartime orders.'2° It also provides for resti-
tution in the sum of $20,000 to all Japanese internees surviving as of
the date of enactment.'12 Through the mechanism of the public hear-
ings and subsequent congressional validation of their findings, the
113. R. DANIELS, supra note 108, at 168-69.
114. B. HOSOKAWA, JACL IN QUEST OF JUSTICE 343-59 (1982).
115. Proclamation No. 4417, 3 C.F.R. 8 (1977).
116. B. HOSOKAWA, supra note 114, at 349-50.
117. Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians Act § 2, 50 U.S.C.
app. § 1981 (1982).
118. COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS, PERSONAL
JusTIcE DENIED (1982) [hereinafter PERSONAL JUSTICE]; COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION
AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS, PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED PART 2: RECOMMENDATIONS (1983).
119. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 785, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988). In addition to the record
presented by the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, the Subcom-
mittee on Civil Service, Post Office, and General Services of the Committee on Governmental
Affairs of the United States Senate held independent hearings in which additional testimony
concerning the conditions of internment and the politics which produced the policy of reloca-
tion. Recommendations of the Comm'n on Wartime Internment and Relocation of Citizens,
1984: Hearings on S. 2116 Before the Subcomm. on Civil Service, Post Office, and General
Services of the Senate Comm. on Gov't Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
120. Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383, §102, 102 Stat. 903, 904-05 (1988) (to
be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1989).
121. Id. § 105, 102 Stat. at 905-08.
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Japanese American internees have at last received both tangible and
intangible redress for their ordeal.
The other effort to set the record straight, vacating the convictions
through the writ of coram nobis, is still in progress. The common law
writ of coram nobis allows relief akin to that of habeas corpus for
individuals who have served their sentences and prove that an earlier
challenge was unavailable, and that the error leading to his or her con-
viction was fundamental. 2 2 The findings of the Commission and the
researches of such authors as Irons have provided convincing evidence
that the entire Japanese relocation and control program was unconsti-
tutional as applied to citizens. 123 Not only did the FBI and Naval Intel-
ligence believe that a limited group of individuals within the Japanese
American community could be identified on the basis of potential dis-
loyalty, they had compiled lists based on individualized suspicion.124
In no case were reports of Japanese American sabotage or espionage
during or after Pearl Harbor substantiated. 125 On the other hand, ex-
plicit racism on the part of the proponents of exclusion is well docu-
mented, 26 as are implicitly racist assumptions in the governments
reasoning that it was impossible to distinguish loyal from disloyal
among the inscrutable orientals. 27 The result was that in Korematsu,
the very case in which the Court set forth the strict scrutiny test for
laws infringing on the equal protection of the laws for racial minori-
ties, the Court found "pressing public necessity," here military, justi-
fied the restriction on the civil rights of the Japanese. 28  This is
because the Court also found that it had no business second guessing
the military authorities since "Congress, reposing its confidence in
this time of war in our military leaders-as inevitably it must-deter-
mined that they should have the power to do just this [carry out a
program of detention]."1 29 Thus, when the Solicitor General presented
the claims of General DeWitt concerning Japanese espionage and the
122. Hirabayashi v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 1445, 1454-55 (W.D. Wash. 1986)(the court
defines six requirements).
123. PERSONAL JusTIcE, supra note 118; P. IRONS, supra note 9, at 36-62, 278-310.
124. P. IRONS, supra note 9, at 19-24.
125. Id. at 280-84. Indeed, a key Army figure, Col. Karl Bendetsen asserted that "[tihe very
fact that no sabotage has taken place to date [early February, 1942] is a disturbing and confirm-
ing indication that such action will be taken," apparently suggesting that the Japanese organiza-
tion was extraordinarily disciplined, and waiting to strike a crippling blow, perhaps in concert
with invasion. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF WAR, FINAL REPORT: JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE
WEST COAST: 1942, at 34 (1943).
126. See J. TENBROEK, supra note 53, at 68-96.
127. P. IRONS, supra note 9, at 216-18, 237.
128. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
129. Id. at 223.
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impracticability of conducting individual loyalty evaluation as fact,
even though he was aware of the contrary findings of both the mili-
tary's own intelligence and the FBI, the Court did not inquire further.
Thus the effect of the strict test was foiled by equally strict deference
to a groundless claim of "necessity."1 30
Minorou Yasui died, leaving Fred Korematsu and Gordon Hirabaya-
shi to continue their appeals. 3 ' While Yasui lost at the district court
level, Korematsu's petition was granted. 3 2 Hirabayashi's convictions
were ultimately vacated in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, after
the district court sought to distinguish between the curfew and evacua-
tion violations on the ground that the Supreme Court would have af-
firmed his conviction on the former charge even with accurate
knowledge of the facts underlying the supposed military necessity for
the control of Japanese Americans.'33 Yet the victory is not complete,
for as the court said in granting Korematsu's petition for coram
nobis:
The court's decision today does not reach any errors of law
suggested by petitioner. At common law, the writ of coram nobis
was used to correct errors of fact. It was not used to correct legal
errors and this court has no power, nor does it attempt, to correct
such errors. Thus, the Supreme Court's decision stands as the law of
this case and for whatever precedental value it may still have.'3 4
Another group of Japanese Americans have also attempted to use
the courts to press tort and takings claims against the United States
government. They have had more success, however, in breaking new
jurisdictional and procedural ground than in obtaining relief."' Given
that the acceptance of the statutory compensation "shall be in full
satisfaction of all claims against the United States" arising from the
detention experience, there is some question as to the continued utility
of the takings and tort claim suit. 13 6
In Britain there were more attempts by detainees to secure relief by
action in the regular courts than there were in the United States. In
130. Irons, Fancy Dancing in the Marble Palace, 3 CONST. COMMENTARY 35, 39-45 (1986).
131. Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591, 594 n.4 (9th Cir. 1987).
132. Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
133. Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1987), aff'g in part 627 F. Supp.
1445, 1457-58 (W'.D. Wash. 1986).
134. Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at 1420 (citation omitted).
135. Hohri v. United States, 586 F. Supp. 769 (D.D.C. 1984) (holding all claims time
barred), aff'd in part, 782 F.2d 227 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (allowing takings claim), rev'd, 107 S. Ct.
2246 (1987) (remanding to court of proper jurisdiction), aff'd, 847 F.2d 779 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(affirming district court denial of claims).
136. Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383, § 102, 102 Stat. 903, 905 (1988).
DETENTION WITHOUT TRIAL
addition to the two leading cases which alone reached the highest
court, the House of Lords, at least thirteen other actions were com-
menced before these two cases were decided. These cases were princi-
pally habeas corpus proceedings but also included actions for false
imprisonment and one for an order of mandamus; there may have
been six more actions commenced but never pursued. 3 7 Later in the
war other suits were brought. However, these suits were not so much
aimed at securing liberty as to obtaining compensation for the prison
conditions in which detainees were held. 3 ' This very un-British rash of
litigation, nonetheless, delivered only one release, and the British legal
system, like the American, delivered virtually nothing to the detainees.
This British litigation was not organized by any group opposing de-
tention. An institution called the Council of Civil Liberties took a
considerable interest in Regulation 18B and engaged in some cam-
paigning against it. 1 9 It appears to have been heavily under the influ-
ence of the Communist Party, and early in the war, party members
were nervous over Regulation 18B. Once the Regulation was directed
against fascists, the Council began to see the matter in a new light,
and this may explain the failure to sponsor test cases. We may be con-
fident that, had communists been detained for membership in the
party, the Council would have been more active in the courts. In fact,
most of the litigation was handled by one London solicitor, Oswald
Hickson, who was not a fascist but merely a lawyer who seems to
have been outraged by the notion that citizens could be detained with-
out trial. 14 Hickson came into contact with detainees principally, I
think, because his firm had long represented the Mosley family, and I
understand still does.
In Britain no question of the constitutionality of the Defense Regu-
lations could arise since no power of constitutional review exists. It
137. No list exists. These cases involved Mathilde Randall, PRO TS 27/495; Lieutenant
Francis Fane, PRO TS 27/513; Captain Charles Budd, PRO TS 27/506; Arthur Campbell, PRO
TS 27/507; Sir Barry Domvile, Rita Shelmerdine, Harald de Laessoe, Emily Durell, William
Sherston, PRO TS 27/491, 511; Harry Sabini, see supra note 90; Aubrey Lees, see infra note
148; John Smeaton-Stuart, PRO TS 27/491, 493, and John Mason, The Times (London), Feb.
9, 1941, at 9, col. 5. PRO TS 27/493 contains a note of six other actions pending, two of which
involved Sir Oswald and Lady Mosley.
138. See, e.g., Arbon v. Anderson [1943] 1 All E.R. 154.
139. Neil Stammers has consulted records kept at the University of Hull and gives an ac-
count of the Council's activities. The Council for Civil Liberties' records for the period are
accessible in the University of Hull, but I have not yet had an opportunity to consult them. N.
STAMMERS, supra note 11, at 78, 84 n.53.
140. Telephone interview with Carter Ruck, former solicitor with Oswald Hickson, Collier
& Co. (Jul. 15, 1988). Oswald Squire Hickson (1877-1944) was senior partner in the firm of
Oswald Hickson, Collier & Co., which still exists in London. See also 4 WHO WAS WHO 538
(1952).
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was not possible to argue that the regulations dealing with detention
were outside the powers conferred by the parent Act of Parliament,
since they plainly were not.' 4' However, the courts could pass on the
legality of the detention of particular individuals; detention would
only be lawful if authorized correctly in accordance with the scheme
of the regulations. Before the two leading cases involving Liversidge
and Greene, there were three important decisions on the legality of the
detentions. The first involved Harry Sabini, alias Harry Handley,
alias Henry Handley, alias Henry S. and Harry Roy, the "small time
crook.' ' 42 Along with his brother, Darby, he had been detained on
June 14, 1940, and appeared before the Advisory Committee on De-
cember 3. I do not know the outcome, for the report has been lost or
weeded from the file. At any rate, whatever the recommendation of
the Committee, the Secretary did not release him. He sought habeas
corpus before a Divisional Court of the King's Bench Division on De-
cember 20, 1940. 43 The order had described him as Harry Sabini,
alias Harry Handley, and he swore an affidavit that he had never used
the second name. Counsel based his case on mistaken identity; the
police had arrested a person against whom no order had ever been
made. The proceedings were adjourned until January 20, 1.941 for the
matter to be clarified by the Home Office. At the reconvened hearing,
evidence was tendered to the Court which demonstrated that Harry
had lied in his affidavit. The court rejected his application, but made
it clear that in a case of real mistaken identity the detainee would be
set free. This assumed a very limited power of review. Harry was in-
deed released by the Home Secretary in March of 1941, promptly
rearrested, and charged with perjury, for which he received nine
months imprisonment in July. 144
The second case was that of Captain Charles Henry Bentinck Budd,
a distinguished and severely wounded army officer in the first war
who was, at the time of his detention on June 15, 1940, once more
serving his country as an adjutant in the Royal Engineers.145 In the
1930s, Budd had been an official in Mosley's fascist party, but he had
left the party in 1939. Budd had been included in a long schedule of
names on an omnibus order based on membership, or recent member-
ship, of the British Union. When arrested he had been served with a
141. The King ex rel. Zadig v. Halliday, [1916] 1 K.B. 738 (C.A.) aff'd, [1917] A.C. 260 (a
decision on the corresponding Regulation 14B during the 1914-1918 war).
142. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
143. In re Sabini, The Times (London), Jan. 21, 1941, at 2, col. 7 (K.B., Jan. 20, 1941) (case
otherwise unreported).
144. PRO TS 27/496A; PRO HO 45/25720.
145. PRO TS 27/506; The Times (London), May 28, 1941, at 9, col. 5. See supra note 8.
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supposed copy of this single order, but this did not correspond with
the original, as it named an entirely different ground for detention. So
his counsel argued and the court agreed, that Budd had been arrested
and detained under an order which had never in fact been made,
though there did, of course, exist another order under which he could
have been arrested. This way of looking at the matter treated the os-
tensible basis of arrest as critical to the legality of arrest and was
wholly formalistic. The court's order to release Budd indicated that
the courts would insist upon precise formal conformity, so that what
were essentially clerical or administrative errors could lead to release.
Of course this did not prevent detainees from being re-arrested under
new orders, as were Budd and eleven other individuals in whose cases
the same mistake had been made. 146 Since there were many cases un-
der other orders where formal errors had been made, this decision
caused considerable alarm in the Home Office, where the officials did
not relish being made to look sloppy and inefficient in the courts. An
internal review of the Italian orders of June 10, 1940, revealed an
alarming catalogue of mistakes, and it was felt prudent to keep quiet
about this.147 As detainees were released, the problem tended to go
away.
The third case involved one Aubrey Lees, detained on June 20, 1940
under an order based on his membership in the British Union of Fas-
cists.1 4 Lees was a colonial civil servant who had served in Palestine
under the Mandate. He was violently anti-Semitic, extremely right
wing, and altogether a pretty nasty piece of work. But he was not, and
never had been, a member of the British Union. 149 He sought habeas
corpus and swore an affidavit to this effect. The government lawyers
did not challenge this. But they replied by putting in affidavits from
Sir John Anderson saying that he, on the basis of reports carefully
considered by him personally, had clear grounds for believing, and
did in fact believe, that Lees was a member, and that he believed that
on this ground it was necessary to detain Lees. Regulation 18B re-
quired that the Home Secretary should have "reasonable cause to be-
lieve" that the detainee fell into a detainable category, and that by
reason thereof it was necessary to detain him. 50 So the government
146. Budd contested his redetention and Mr. Justice Stable dissented, viewing the redeten-
tion as unlawful. See [1941] 2 All E.R. 749, 758-65.
147. TS 27/509.
148. Exparte Lees, [1941] 1 K.B. 72, aff'g 57 T.L.R. 68 (C.A. 1940). See also PRO HO 45/
25728; HO 283/45.
149. See R. TmxuRow, supra note 11, at 185, 203-04.
150. Emergency Powers (Defence) General Regulations, S.R. & 0. 1939, No. 1681, 18B(1)
(Detention Orders).
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lawyers were contending, in effect, that the legality of Lees' detention
turned not on whether he was in reality a party member, but on
whether the Home Secretary, when he signed the order, genuinely and
reasonably thought he was.'
The court was not a little unsettled by this. Latent common sense
must have prompted the feeling that, if Lees was telling the truth, his
detention was unjustified, though the position of the government law-
yers would seem to have conformed to a sort of Alice in Wonderland
logic. This common sense theory assumed that the court had the
power to examine the legality of detention and in doing so to examine
the basis for the Home Secretary's belief. But this power, if exercised,
would have involved the court in a general investigation of the MI5
reports, in effect establishing the courts, and not the Home Secretary,
advised by his committee, as the arbiters of detention. From this un-
restricted power of judicial review the court uneasily backed off; the
investigation was fictionalized by being confined merely to reading the
Home Secretary's affidavit. Sir John Anderson, so the court rea-
soned, said he believed Lees was a party member, and said he had
reasonable grounds for this belief. That was enough to satisfy the
court, at least on this particular occasion, for it ruled that no general
rule could be laid down as to how the basis of the Minister's belief
would be investigated in other cases. 5 2 The practical effect of the Lees
decision was that so long as the formalities were observed, the Home
office could win almost any case by producing formal affidavits from
the Home Secretary, affidavits involving an economical use of the
truth, for it is not likely that more than a moment, if that, would in
reality have been devoted to Lees's case by Sir John.
The language employed in Lees-to the effect that the basis of de-
tention could be investigated-left open a slim chance that the courts
would order the release of detainees who could, without securing ac-
cess to confidential material in the Home Office and MI5 files, affir-
matively show that there was no reasonable basis for their detention.
One such situation would be a case of mistaken identity; another
would be a case of detention for specific "acts prejudicial" where the
detainee could show, without delving into Home Office files, a cast-
iron alibi. Lees was not such a case, for by 1940 the membership re-
cords of the British Union, if indeed any existed, would have been
hidden or in the custody of the intelligence service. Although the fail-
ure of the government lawyers to claim that Lees was a member of the
151. Lees, [1941] 1 K.B. at 78.
152. ExParte Lees, 57 T.L.R. at 68, 69-70 (C.A. 1940), aff'd, [1941] 1 K.B. 72.
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party suggested that Lees was telling the truth, it could not be said
that he had certainly demonstrated this by affirmative evidence.
The first of the two leading cases on detention without trial ad-
dressed just such a situation. Although Robert William Liversidge,
alias Jack Perlsweig, appears in the law report as little more than a
name, he was a real person.'53 He was born in London on June 11,
1904, the son of Asher and Sarah Perlsweig, who had emigrated from
Russia to England sometime between 1895 and then no doubt in reac-
tion to the violent anti-Semitism which developed in Russia at this pe-
riod. Starting in somewhat humble circumstances, he rose in life to
become, by the 1930s, a wealthy businessman. Other members of his
family too had prospered; one of his brothers, Maurice Perlsweig, be-
came a very distinguished rabbi prominent in the Zionist movement,
working during the war in New York to help Jews who were victims
of European fascism.
Liversidge got into some trouble in his youth, at one point fled
from England to escape arrest on a fraud charge, and ended up run-
ning a recording studio in Hollywood. While the charge was dropped,
and he had never been convicted of any offense, the London police
had a file on him and viewed him with a jaundiced eye. Early in the
1930s he began to use the name Liversidge, which was the married
name of his sister. He formally changed his name in 1938. In 1939 he
volunteered to join the Royal Air Force, undoubtedly for purely patri-
otic reasons; being a Jew he had every reason to detest Hitlerism.
Nervous lest his foreign parentage might tell against him, and perhaps
because he feared anti-Semitism in the recruiting system, he falsified
date, place of birth, and parentage, claiming to have been born a Liv-
ersidge in Canada on May 28, 1901.
He became an intelligence officer and, so his Commanding Officer,
the Earl of Selkirk, assures me, a very good one. 15 4 He worked from
February 27, 1940 at the headquarters of Fighter Command. Among
other duties he was involved in maintaining records of aircraft
strengths and in attempts to forecast enemy raids. However, the false
statements regarding his background came to light, and he was ar-
153. Information on Liversidge is principally based upon PRO TS 27/501. I am also grateful
to informants who include Air Commodore H.A. Probert, the Earl of Selkirk, Professor R.V.
Jones and Professor DeLloyd Guth. See also REPORT OF THE TRIBUNAL APPOINTED TO INQUIRE
INTO ALLEGATIONS REFLECTING ON THE OFFICIAL CONDUCT OF MINISTERS OF THE CROWN AND
OTHER PUBLIC SERVANTS, 1949, CMND. SER. 4, No. 7616, at 6-8. Known as the Lynskey Tribunal
after its chair Sir G. Justin Lynskey, the tribunal investigated Liversidge in connection with
allegations of bribery concerning Mr. John Belcher, M.P. and found that Liversidge's involve-
ment with Belcher in obtaining an "export license for paper cement bags" was not improper. Id.
154. Letter from Earl of Selkirk to A.W.B. Simpson (Dec. 10, 1986).
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rested by the Air Force on April 26, 1940. Further enquiries revealed
material in the police file. He could have been charged with the of-
fense involved in his enlistment but, given the patriotic motive, this
would not have led to any serious penalty. It is clear from papers
which have been released that MI5 was not at all keen to take the
initiative in having him detained. 5 One can only guess why, but Liv-
ersidge's associates and business interests suggest that he may have
been, to put it no higher, of interest to the intelligence community. He
had been involved in industrial diamonds, the brokerage of oil royal-
ties, and an attempt to secure the patent rights in the first practical
helicopter, the German Focke-Achgelis FW-61, which first flew in
1936.156 These were areas of considerable official interest at the time,
in particular, oil. His codirectors in one company included Colonel
Cudbert J.M. Thornhill (1883-1952), a former intelligence officer in
Russia who had worked in the Political Intelligence Department of the
Foreign Office in 1940-1946,117 and Colonel Norman Thwaites (1872-
1956), Britain's chief of intelligence in New York in the 1914-1918
war." 8 Liversidge also knew Sir William Stephenson, head of British
intelligence in the United States during the Second World War. 159 Liv-
ersidge's brother had contacts with M16. The intelligence community
may have preferred to have Liversidge at large, and his connections
may have meant that there existed an MI5 file on him before 1940. In
the event, the Air Force authorities persuaded Sir John Anderson to
order Liversidge's detention, which he did by an order of May 28,
1940, based upon his "hostile associations."'160
This ground was tenuous indeed. As a businessman Liversidge had
European contacts and knew some persons of German nationality,
but the Home Office knew that this was not the real reason the Air
Force wanted Liversidge detained. The real reason was that in his
work with Fighter Command he had had access to Fighter Command
155. PRO TS 27/501.
156. See C. GIBBS-SMITH, AVIATION: AN HISTORICAL SURVEY FROM ITS ORIGINS TO THE END
OF WORLD WAR II, at 196, 209, Plate XXI (1970). In 1938 a British helicopter of very similar
design, the Weir W5, flew.
157. See C. ANDREW, supra note 14, at 204-06, 217; 5 WHO WAS WHO 1085 (1961) (includes
an impressive list of White Russian decorations).
158. See 5 WHO WAS WHO 1087 (1961). Thwaites wrote two volumes of memoirs. N.
THWAITES, VELVET AND VINEGAR (1922); N. THWAITES, THE WORLD MINE OYSTER (which I
know only by reputation). See also C. ANDREW, supra note 14, at 214; R. GRIFFITHS, supra note
81, at 52, 137.
159. See supra note 153. Sir William Stephenson features prominently in W. STEVENSON, A
MAN CALLED INTREPID (1976) and H. MONTGOMERY HYDE, THE QUIET CANADIAN (1962). See
also C. ANDREW, supra note 14, at 358, 465-67, 473. Sir William has retired to Bermuda and
remains discreet.
160. PRO TS 27/501.
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secrets, "very secret information" it was called, and that he was
thought to be an untrustworthy person because of his false statements
and police file. The Air Force wanted him isolated to obviate any risk
that this information might be passed on. Even this reason was rather
flimsy, since there was little or no reason to doubt his patriotism.
Therefore, the order for his detention was an abuse of power, perhaps
understandable in May of 1940, but an abuse nevertheless. The Advi-
sory Committee realized this when they reviewed his case, but the
Committee, adopting its settled policy, was not prepared to resolve
their doubts in favor of Liversidge and against the Air Force.' 61 This
decision was, of course, taken in October, 1940 at the height of the
Battle of Britain. It was not a moment at which patriotic individuals
were anxious to do anything whatsoever to weaken the air defenses of
Britain. So Liversidge remained in detention.
Some doubt surrounds what secret information so worried the Air
Force. It may have been normal operational information, including
air strengths on which Liversidge worked; it may have involved infor-
mation used to forecast German raids. Liversidge had successfully
forecast a raid on the Fleet anchorage at Scapa Flow on April 10,
1940. It is even possible that there was fear that he had some inkling
of the British success in reading the German Enigma codes, the big-
gest secret of the whole war, though I doubt this. Whatever the rea-
son, Liversidge was detained in Brixton Prison, and his name was
included on a list of prominent people detained which was supplied
weekly to Winston Churchill in the summer of 1940.162
The subject of the second leading case on detention without trial of
British citizens, Ben Greene, had a very different background.' 63 A
member of the same family as were the novelist Graham Greene and
the Director General of the BBC, Sir Hugh Carleton Greene, he was a
Quaker pacifist who had been much engaged in philanthropic work in
Europe. He had also been involved in Labour Party politics, having
once been the private secretary to Ramsay MacDonald, the party
leader. He was a prominent local citizen in Berkhamstead, where he
was a lay Justice of the Peace and ran a business concern. He re-
garded the Treaty of Versailles after the 1914-1918 war as a disaster,
and to that extent sympathized with Germany. There is no reason,
however, to think that he was either anti-Semitic or fascist, indeed he
161. PRO TS 27/501. See also PRO HO 45/25754.
162. See PRO HO 45/25747. Curiously enough, the list also contains the name of Frederick
W. Braune, a London solicitor of German extraction who was also detained, and who later
represented Liversidge in litigation.
163. See PRO TS 27/522; A. MASTERS, supra note 15, at 141-67 (makes use of the Greene
papers); J. MILLER, supra note 13, at 94; R. ThuRZow, supra note 11, at 172, 204, 212.
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had been active in refugee relief efforts. Greene regarded the war of
1939 as yet another disaster and, after leaving the Labour Party, cam-
paigned against the war. He was a founding member and Treasurer of
the British People's Party, but resigned in October 1939. This Party
was chaired by the Marquess of Tavistock, later the twelfth Duke of
Bedford, an ardent admirer of Hitler. Early in the war Greene had
obscure connections with various individuals-some pacifists, some
cryptofascists-who believed in a negotiated peace with Hitler. Sir Os-
wald Mosley, Admiral Sir Barry Domvile, Archibald Maule Ramsay
M.P. and perhaps the Duke of Windsor, were involved, as was an
organization called the Right Club, whose membership list was seized
in May, 1940 but which has never been released.164 It must be appreci-
ated that in Britain in 1939 there were numerous individuals of some
social prominence who sympathized with both Hitler and Mussolini,
of whom only a minority would actually join the British Union of
Fascists. Furthermore, since memories of the unspeakable horrors of
the trench warfare of 1914-1918 were very much alive, it is hardly sur-
prising that there were those who preferred peace.
Ben Greene was detained on May 28, 1940 on the basis of an order
signed on May 18, 1940 which cited his "hostile association.' 1 65 On
July 15, in Brixton Prison, he was supplied with the "grounds" and
"particulars" in the "Reasons for Order." These said the order was
based on "acts prejudicial," a very grave accusation.' 66 The particu-
lars alleged action which indeed amounted to treason, including com-
munication with the enemy. At this time treason was a capital offense
for which one could still, in theory, be hanged, drawn, and quartered.
The case against Greene was based upon reports by two undercover
MI5 agents, run by Charles Maxwell-Knight, a somewhat sinister and
eccentric model (though not the only one) for "M" in the James Bond
stories. He was noted for his strange pet animals, including Bessie the
Bear, and after the war he became known as a popular naturalist. 67
One agent was Friedl Gaertner, alias Fraulein Stottingen, code name
"Gelatine" ("Pretty Little Thing"), an Austrian who started public
life as a Nazi agent, coming to join her sister Liesel, a stripper, in
164. See A. MASTERS, supra note 15, at 89; J. MILLER, supra note 13, at 21-37.
165. PRO TS 27/522.
166. One version of the text is in print in MASTERS, supra note 15, at 148-50. However the
text, which I am sure Masters has obtained from the Greene papers, gives the amended "Rea-
sons for Order" served on June 10, 1941, which conform with the order in giving the grounds as
"hostile associations," and thus corrects the error made in the original "Reasons for Order"
found in PRO TS 27/522.
167. See generally A. MASTERS, supra note 15; J. MILLER, supra note 13.
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London before the war and ending up a double agent. 16 She appears
to have been useful in this role, and M15 was very keen to preserve her
cover, as appears from papers connected with litigation by Ben
Greene. 69 The other was Harald (later Harold) Kurtz, the impecuni-
ous grandson of an English baronet, Sir John Don-Wauchope (1816-
1911).170 He had worked in the BBC German section (which was pre-
sumably under the control of the intelligence services) and then as a
stool pigeon in internment camps. He ended up as a historian, writ-
ing, among other things, a life of the Empress Eugenie.' 7 1 He died of
drink in Oxford in the late seventies having attempted in his declining
years, so I am credibly, but confidentially, informed, to support his
habit by stealing manuscripts from libraries. 72 Kurtz and Gaertner re-
ported conversations with Greene on which charges of "acts prejudi-
cial" were apparently based. Materials in the Public Record Office
suggest that there were two other agents involved, but their names do
not appear. 13
Greene brought habeas corpus proceedings, while Liversidge insti-
tuted an action for false imprisonment. Liversidge's action was, for
technical reasons, the more important legally. 174 Liversidge's lawyer,
Oswald Hickson, attempted to obtain an order for discovery of the
168. See A. MASTERS, supra note 15, passim; J. MILLER, supra note 13, at 86-89. Friedel may
have married an American diplomat. J. MILLER, supra note 13, at 153. Liesel married Ian Men-
zies, the younger brother of Sir Stewart Menzies, head of M16. A. MASTERS, supra note 15, at
71. On the wartime double agents operating in Britain the best source is J. MASTERMAN, THE
DOUBLE CROSS SYSTEM (1972) (notes, but does not identify, "Gelatine"). Masterman was an
Oxford academic who became Provost of Worcester College; he worked in MI5 during the war
and apparently had been an unofficial intelligence agent in Oxford before the war. See also L.
FARAGO, supra note 19, at 334. Farago notes "Gelatine's" connections with Major General
J.H.C. Fuller, a well-know military writer and a fellow traveller of the far right, indicating that
her duties included association with fascists. PRO TS 27/522 includes references to her as Fred-
ericka Stottingen, and there is some doubt as to which of her names is real and which is an alias.
169. Liesel's marriage to Ian Menzies would put Friedel in contact with British official life.
170. R.F.V. Heuston claims that Kurtz's mother was the daughter of Sir William Don, but
that he was of German nationality. Heuston, Liversidge v. Anderson: Two Footnotes, 87 L.Q.R.
161, 164 (1971) [hereinafter Heuston, Two Footnotes]. This may be correct; my identification is
not based on firm evidence. Sir William Don (1861-1926) was not, however, a baronet.
171. H. KURTZ, THE EMPRESS EUGENIE, 1826-1920 (1964).
172. See generally A. MASTERS, supra note 15, at 111-12, 141-42, 152-67; J. MILLER, supra
note 13, at 91-94; R. THURLOW, supra note 11, at 204-05.
173. PRO TS 27/522.
174. Accounts of the passions to which the case gave rise amongst the judiciary at the time
are given by R.F.V. Heuston. Heuston, Liversidge v. Anderson in Retrospect, 86 L.Q.R. 33
(1970) [hereinafter Heuston, Retrospect]; Heuston, Two Footnotes, supra note 170, at 163.
These were based on papers exceptionally made available to Heuston by the Home Office, prin-
cipally, I think, on a transcript of the case, which is also accessible in the Greene Papers. See
also Allen, Regulation 18B and Reasonable Cause, 58 L.Q.R. 232 (1942); Keeton, Liversidge v.
Anderson, 5 M.L.R. 162 (1941).
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grounds upon which the Home Secretary thought him to be of hostile
associations and a person who needed to be detained. 17 In an action
for false imprisonment the onus of proof is on the defendant. The
attorneys sought to prise out of the Home Office a fuller statement of
the reasons for detention than that given in the "Reasons for Order."
This statement could then be attacked in the eventual trial of the ac-
tion, thus providing a basis upon which to challenge Liversidge's de-
tention. However, the House of Lords, by a majority, ruled that no
such order should be made, since it would bring before the court ma-
terial which it was not the business of the court to consider. 176
The scheme of the Defence Regulations had given the job of decid-
ing whether individuals fell into a detainable category to the executive,
in the person of the Home Secretary, and not to the courts. Thus in
the absence of formal irregularity or bad faith (which in practice
could never be proved), the decision of the executive could not be re-
viewed by the courts. So the case was treated as having been decided
by ascertaining that the executive rather than the judiciary had juris-
diction. This refusal to review largely disposed of the Greene case as
well, the production of the Home Secretary's order being a sufficient
answer to the action. 177 So far as the Liversidge case is concerned, the
legal basis for the detention was very shaky indeed, and I find it diffi-
cult to acquit the government of something near sharp practice.
As it happened, after argument in the House of Lords, but before
the opinions were delivered, Ben Greene's brother managed to lure
Kurtz into Greene's lawyers' office. In front of Oswald Hickson,
Kurtz withdrew his allegations against Greene, but it was too late to
be used to put a different complexion on the case. 7 The names of the
two agents, but not their whereabouts, had been provided to Hickson
on the advice of the Attorney General of the day, since he feared los-
ing the action if their identities were not released. I do not know why
he took this view, but suspect that the very gravity of the wrongdoing
alleged against Greene was such that it seemed quite improper to re-
fuse him any chance to challenge the evidence on which the charges
175. In the House of Lords, Liversidge's leading counsel was D.N. Pritt, a Member of Par-
liament in the Labour Party, but as Pritt was not engaged when the case was first litigated, I
assume that he did not devise this scheme. He gives an inaccurate account of the caSe in his
autobiography. Pritt, a closet communist, was much involved with the Council for Civil Liber-
ties, but that organization was not involved in the case. D. PRITT, Tim AuToBIoG.APY OF D.N.
PRITT, PART ONE FROM RIGHT TO LEFT 232-33, 304-07 (1965).
176. Liversidge v. Anderson, [1942] A.C. 206.
177. Greene v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs, [1942] A.C. 284. See also A. MASTERS,
supra note 15, at 162.
178. A. MASTERS, supra note 15, at 158-61.
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were based, and that in this small regard, a respect for civil liberties
prevailed in the face of the claims of security.
Greene was released on January 9, 1942, and the Home Office, un-
der political pressure, publicly withdrew the allegations of treason.17 9
Greene brought a further action for false imprisonment and libel, al-
leging bad faith against the Home Secretary, Sir John Anderson. This
collapsed, partly because the sinister Kurtz, called as a witness, now
testified that he had only withdrawn his allegations in Hickson's of-
fice under standing instructions from Maxwell-Knight to deny any in-
volvement with M15. 80 Liversidge had been released a little earlier, on
December 31, 1941 .181 The government fought the cases, not because
it was really necessary to keep Greene or Liversidge in detention, but
in the hope of securing a favorable decision which could be used to
resist other challenges. To the officials, the value of the decisions lay
principally in their protection of executive secrecy. A contemporary
memorandum by one of the government lawyers puts it neatly. "[T]he
value of a judgement in our favor in the House of Lords would be
that we could avoid in the future this probing into reasons in cases in
which it is embarrassing to give them." 18 2
Once the cases were won and the government's shield of secrecy had
been preserved, the two detainees could be released. Thereafter more
and more individuals were set at liberty. 83 Agitation against Regula-
tion 18B died down; there were in fact many protests in November
1943, when Sir Oswald Mosley was released, the protests coming in
particular from the Council for Civil Liberties. 184
What general conclusions can be drawn from the experience of ex-
ecutive detention of citizens in the two countries? The first point I
should emphasize is the difference in the scale and duration of deten-
tion. It was much greater in America, despite much weaker justifica-
tion in terms of military necessity. Here I am afraid that the
explanation lies in that evil force, racial antagonism towards a large,
179. 377 PARu. DEB. (5th ser.) 441 (1942). Morrison, however, refused to acknowledge that
Greene had been detained solely on a single informant's unsworn testimony and steadily refused
calls to institute perjury charges against that informant. Id. at 904-05, 1255-57, 1575. Morrison
maintained that merely because the Advisory Committee found an allegation unsubstantiated,
"it does not follow either that such allegation was a malicious invention or that the original
order of detention was unjustified." Id. at 1256.
180. See Heuston, Retrospect, supra note 174; Heuston, Two Footnotes, supra note 170.
Material on this is also in the Greene Papers in the custody of his son, Edward Greene.
181. PROTS27/501.
182. PRO 45/25758 (letter from A.C. Newman to Norman Kendal of Sept. 3, 1941).
183. See N. STAMMERS, supra note 11, at 74 (noting an increase in political pressure for
release after the Liversidge judgment).
184. Id. at 78-79. See also R. THURLOW, supra note 11, at 231.
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identifiable ethnic group, "a discrete and insular minority."' 85 In say-
ing this I do not wish to appear chauvinistic. I am afraid that racism
both today, and at earlier periods, has been influential in Britain too,
but it was not a force on this particular occasion in the use of Regula-
tion 18B. I must add, however, that regarding the treatment of alien
refugees detained under the prerogative, a case can be made for saying
that anti-Semitism played some part in influencing policy and treat-
ment, but that is another story.'8 6
My second point is the complete failure of the regular courts to pro-
vide any substantial protection against misconduct by the executive,
even granted the need for some measure of detention. In both coun-
tries the legal system simply failed to deliver, and again the position
seems to have been worse in the United States than in Britain. This, to
me at least, is surprising in light of the Constitution and power of
judicial review. The British courts must get some modest number of
Brownie points for at least emphasizing the need for procedural regu-
larity. In both countries there was impassioned dissent-in Britain in
Liversidge by Lord Atkin, in America in Koramatsu by Justices Rob-
erts, Murphy and Jackson. Here I feel that America comes out rather
better in this regard. As I have argued elsewhere,18 7 I do not think that
Lord Atkin's dissent in Liversidge was principally motivated by enthu-
siasm for civil liberty; he was concerned rather over the relative status
of the judiciary and the mandarins of the civil service. This can not be
said of the dissenters in Koramatsu. Furthermore, the legal commu-
nity in America, both in criticizing the decision'88 and in seeking over
the years since then to offer some redress for the wrongs then done,
has surely something of which to be proud. 8 9 The idea that any sort
of compensation should be offered to the 18B detainees has never
even been mooted in Britain. No doubt the belief, which is not cor-
185. Carolene Prods. Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1937). In Korematsu
Justice Black expanded and made explicit the principal that:
all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immedi-
ately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to
say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny. Pressing public necessity
may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions; racial antagonism never can.
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). As Irons has demonstrated, the American
officials made quite economical use of the truth concerning public, here military, necessity, while
the United States courts, like their British counterparts, willingly accepted the word of those
officials at face value. P. IRONS, supra note 9, at 278-310.
186. See generally R. STENT, supra note 20.
187. A. SxMpsoN, supra note 11, at 31.
188. See Dembitz, Racial Discrimination and the Military Judgment, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 175
(1945); Rostow, The Japanese American Case: A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489 (1945).
189. See supra notes 111-34 and accompanying text.
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rect, that they were all fascists who had it coming to them, is part of
the explanation for this.190
The third point is the fragility of law and constitutional rights in the
face of strong political pressure, and the importance, which one can
easily underestimate, of having deeply rooted conventions of political
morality and acceptable behavior, held by those involved in the proc-
ess of government. Indeed, the sordid story of wartime detention illus-
trates that the autonomy of law as an independent force, capable of
controlling the exercise of coercive power, is merely an ideal state of
affairs, and that in the real world ideals are never fully realized-par-
ticularly in times of stress. Insofar as Americans from Germany and
Italy were not harassed during the Second World War, this was the
result not so much of law or the legal system, but of other more sub-
tle, often political, restraints; insofar as members of one group, the
Americans of Japanese descent, were oppressed, it was because the
evil force of racism overcame these cultural restraints. 191 In Britain,
the very modest use of the powers conferred by the Defense Regula-
tions and the progressive release of detainees after the panic year of
1940 can only partly be explained by tighter legal arrangements.
Along with the absence of a racial dimension in Britain, a more wide-
spread commitment to civil liberty among those involved in govern-
ment had more to do with Britain's relative adherence to liberal ideals
than the formal legal niceties. But, I do not believe that such a com-
mitment flourishes in an atmosphere of governmental secrecy in
which, even in peacetime, there is extensive covert activity by govern-
ment agents and acceptance of the overweening claims of national se-
curity. Thus I am not confident that in either Britain or America all is
as it ought to be, or even as well as it was then. I hope I am wrong.
But of one thing we can be quite sure, the successor to Regulation 18B
is, as I speak, alive and well, and living in the Home Office, just off
Hyde Park in London, ready for use if there is a next time.
190. See N. STAMMERS, supra note 11, at 76, 80-81.
191. See PERSONAL JUSTICE, supra note 105, at 28-44; J. TENBROEK, supra note 53, passim.
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